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Trouble Down Under: Some Thoughts on the AustralianAmerican Corporate Bankruptcy Divide
PaulB. Lewis*
I. INTRODUCTION

A successful system of corporate reorganization should accomplish two
primary things. First, it should determine which firms in bankruptcy are
essentially non-viable; these firms should be liquidated. Second, it should
provide a mechanism for viable firms to remain functioning entities. In this
Article, I contend that the American corporate bankruptcy system is flawed'
in that it fails to consistently and efficiently achieve these two fundamental
goals. By contrast, the Australian corporate reorganization system, known
as "Voluntary Administration," largely succeeds on both counts.
There are numerous reasons for the disparity between the American
and Australian systems. One core distinction is the treatment afforded
creditors of insolvent firms. Insolvent firms are effectively owned by their
creditors.2 In situations of insolvency, creditors, who primarily bear the

*Associate Professor, Mercer University Law School; J.D., Yale University; B.A.,
Northwestern University. Funding for this research was provided by a grant from the David
C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies. This Article was first presented at a workshop at the
University of Western Sydney in Sydney, Australia. I am indebted to many people in
Australia for their insights into the Australian insolvency process. In particular, I thank
George Caddy and Bob Cruickshanks ofthe Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia; Diana
Kincaid of the University of Western Sydney-Hawkesbury; Rosalind Mason of the
University of Southern Queensland; Linda Johnson of Mallesons, Stephen & Jacques in
Sydney; Charles Bowdon and Scott Pascoe of'Simms Lockwood in Sydney; and Scott Hedge
of Kemp Strang in Sydney. I also thank Amber Nickell for excellent research assistance.
'The failure of the corporate bankruptcy system, in one form or another, has been a
regular theme in the literature for a number ofyears. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter11:
AnAgendaforBasicReform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573 (1995) [hereinafter LoPucki, Agenda];
Douglas G. Baird, RevisitingAuctions in Chapter11, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 633 (1993); Michael
Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043
(1992); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729 (1993)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Trouble]; Hon. Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penaltyfor
Debtorand CreditorInterests, 77 CoRNELLL. REV. 1088 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A
to CorporateReorganizations,101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988).
New Approach
2
Kham &Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1360 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("Creditors effectively own bankrupt firms."). In fact, the fiduciary duty ofa firm's
directors shifts upon insolvency from the firm's shareholders to its creditors. In re
Mortgageamerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Becoming insolvent, the
equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together with their conditional liability
to the creditors, places the property in a condition of trust, for the creditors, and then for the
stockholders."); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) ("If the
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burden of further loss, should be given ultimate decision-making discretion.
Under the Australian system, creditors-particularly secured creditors-are
afforded certain rights which allow them largely to determine the future of
a troubled firm. In the United States, the rights of creditors in this regard are
more limited.
This Article examines the Australian and American approaches to
corporate reorganization. Both American and Australian bankruptcy law
were initially grounded in the historical English common law system.
However, the two systems have now diverged markedly from their common
roots-the American system doing so at its inception, the Australian
approach not until comparatively recently.3 The two systems in their current
forms take distinctly different approaches to achieving the identical goals
of identifying and saving fundamentally viable companies4 while providing
for the liquidation of those firms that should not survive.
In Part II of this Article, I provide an overview of the Australian
approach to corporate insolvency. In Part III, I examine some reorganization
history and provide a brief outline of the American approach to Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 11"). In Part IV, I juxtapose certain
salient elements of the Australian approach with their American counterparts and contend that, in light of established economic theory, there are
numerous relative advantages to the Australian system.

corporation was insolvent at that time it is clear that defendants, as officers and directors
thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of the property for the corporatebeneficiaries [creditors]." (quoting New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397,398 (N.Y. 1953))); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V.v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12510, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("At
least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not
merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.");
FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), ("[W]hen the corporation
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the
creditors.").
3
Inaddition, both the Australian and American approaches to corporate reorganization
have recently been substantially rewritten. In the American case, the last major overhaul was
in 1978 with the enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1994) (enacting Title 11 of United States Code). In
Australia, the revisions date from the early 1990s and became applicable as law in 1993.
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, (Cth), (Austl.)
4
There is no doubt that reorganization has traditionally been seen as generally
preferable to liquidation. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)
(holding that "[b]y permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would
continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners.
Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a
rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap"' (quoting H.R. REP.NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5693, 6179)) (internal citations omitted).
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My conclusion is that, in contrast to the Australian model, the
American approach to corporate reorganization is slow, expensive, and
administratively cumbersome. It also provides inefficient and otherwise
inappropriate incentives, and it frequently empowers the wrong party to
make vital decisions. As a result, the Australian system more successfully
distinguishes those firms with long-term potential viability from those firms
without such prospects, and better assures continuance for the former and

liquidation of the latter.
II. THE AUSTRALIAN

APPROACH TO COMPANY INSOLVENCY

Until relatively recently, Australian corporate insolvency law, like
Australian corporations law generally, largely tracked the historical English
model. As a practical matter, liquidation was essentially all that was
available for businesses.' Beginning in the 1960s, however, a series of
developments6 began which ultimately lead to the creation in 1992 of a
process designed to maximize the value of the on-going business and
preserve the social benefits provided by the business's existence, while also
maintaining value for the company's creditors in the event of a liquidation.7
The process is known as Voluntary Administration,8 and the relevant
5
Two other methods existed to "save" troubled companies though neither was
effectively employed. The first was a private administration available through appointment
of a receiver, which generally benefited only the secured creditor who imposed the process.
The second was a "scheme of arrangement," an expensive and seldomly used process by
which a company could, in theory, be saved. Ron W. Harmer, Comparison of Trends in
NationalLaw: The PacificRim, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 139, 148-49 (1997).
6
Perhaps the most notable development was the success of a process introduced in the
1960s to provide an alternative to straight bankruptcy for individuals engaged in small
business. This process allowed the debtor the opportunity to preserve his or her business
through mutually agreeable arrangements with his or her creditors. See Ron Harmer, An
Overview ofRecent Developments andFutureProspectsin Australia(With Some Reference
to New ZealandandAsia), in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS ININTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 43 (Jacob S. Ziegel & Susan I. Cantile eds., 1994).
7
By 1993, this goal had already been adopted in both the United States and England.
'Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 56 (Austl.) (repealing and being substituted for
5.3A). Outlining its purpose, the newly-enacted part 5.3A states:
The object of this Part is to provide for the business, property and affairs of an
insolvent company to be administered in a way that:
(a) maximises the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business,
continuing in existence; or
(b) if it is not possible for the company or its business to continue in existence-results in a better return for the company's creditors and members than
would result from an immediate winding up of the company.
Id. § 435.
By contrast, the liquidation of a company in insolvency-the equivalent of Chapter 7
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portion of the Australian Corporations Law9 is contained in Part 5.3A,
entitled "Administration of a Company's
Affairs with a View to Executing
10
a Deed of Company Arrangement."'
Voluntary Administration was expressly designed to be a rapid,
inexpensive, straightforward, and flexible means of dealing with troubled
companies' that are either insolvent or "likely to become insolvent."' 2 The
system effectively establishes a two-part approach. The first part is the
appointment ofan administrator; the second is the company operating under
a "deed of company arrangement." The deed of company arrangement is a

under the United States Bankruptcy Code-is governed by Part 5.4, entitled "Winding Up
in Insolvency." Id. § 57. Other options for Australian corporations are also contained in
Chapter 5 of the Australian Corporations Laws. These include: "Schemes of Arrangement"
(Part 5.1); "Receivers, and other Controllers, of Property of Corporations" (Part 5.2);
"Winding Up by the Court on Other Grounds" (Part 5.4A); and "Voluntary Winding Up"
(Part 5.5).
9
Unlike in the United States, where bankruptcy law is exclusively federal and is
codified in Title 11 of the United States Code and where corporate law is governed by the
states, the corporate insolvency laws in Australia are contained in the Australian Corporations
Law. Accordingly, one statute contains all the pertinent regulations for corporations. Like in
the United States, insolvency law is federal and governs nationwide. For a critique of the state
corporate law/federal bankruptcy law dichotomy in the United States, see David A. Skeel,
Rethinking the Line Between CorporateLaw and CorporateBankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV.
471,474-75 (1994) (arguing that Congress should shift authority for corporate reorganization
to states).
"0 Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, §§ 435A-45 ID (Austl).
"THE LAW REFORM COMMJSSiON, GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, Rep. No. 45, vol.
1,$ 54 (1988) (notingthat "[t]he procedure proposed was designed with the aim that it would
be capable of swift implementation, as uncomplicated and inexpensive as possible, flexible,
providing alternative forms of dealing with the financial affairs of the company").
2
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 436A(1)(a) (Austl.). An insolvent company is
one that is unable to pay its debts as they become due. Id. § 95A. While the name suggests
the voluntary nature of the proceedings, Voluntary Administration can occur involuntarily:
"A liquidator or provisional liquidator ofa company may by writing appoint an administrator
of the company if he or she thinks that the company is insolvent, or is likely to become
insolvent at some future time." Id. § 436B(1). In addition, pursuant to section 436C, it can
also be commenced by a creditor holding a lien over all or substantially all of a company's
assets. Id. § 436C(l) (stating that "[a] person who is entitled to enforce a charge on the
whole, or substantially the whole, of a company's property may by writing appoint an
administrator of the company if the charge has become, and is still, enforceable"). Chapter
11, likewise, allows for involuntary proceedings as well, upon a showing that a debtor is
generally not paying its debts as they become due. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1995).
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fairly simple document13 which largely serves the same function as an
American plan of reorganization in Chapter 11.
The appointment of an administrator-most often an accountant who
must also be a registered Insolvency Practitioner14 is typically accomplished by the company's directors signing a form.15 There is no need for a
court filing. 6 In fact, courts are noticeably absent from the general running
of the administration. Rather, their role is largely limited to one of
supervision. 7 The justification for the absence of court involvement is
significant. The resolution of the company's financial difficulties is deemed
to be a matter solely between the company and its creditors, with the
ultimate resolution reflecting what the creditors believe to be in their best
interests." Indeed, one of the express aims of the law is to protect creditor
3
A deed of arrangement is by design far more straightforward than other methods
available to insolvent companies in Australia. It is a "simplified document of much less size
and complexity than the present forms of 'scheme documents' that oppress creditors and
others. The deed will incorporate (by simple reference) standard provisions contained in a
schedule to the companies legislation ..... GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, supra note 11,

at 56.

14

Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 448B (Austl.). A person must consent to the
appointment and can only act as administrator of a company or a deed of trust if he or she is
a registered liquidator.
'5Id. §436A. In addition to directors (§ 436A), liquidators (§ 436B) and creditors with
liens over substantially all of the company's assets (§ 436C) can appoint an administrator.
Empirical studies have shown, however, that 98% of Australian Voluntary Administrations
commence by appointment made by the company's directors. ROMAN TOMASIc & KETURAH
WHirrFORD, AUSTRALiAN INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW § 65, at 168 (2nd ed. 1997).
Neither unsecured nor undersecured creditors may appoint an administrator.
The ease with which a company can enter Voluntary Administration has given rise to
some concerns that hopelessly insolvent companies will abuse the process by employing it
to delay inevitable liquidation. There are two significant safeguards to this: First,a court has
authority to end the administration if it believes the procedure is being abused. Corporate
Law Reform Act, 1992, § 447A (Austl.). Second, as is discussed at length infra,the fact that
certain secured creditors can opt out and foreclose on their collateral assures that it is unlikely
that such abuse could be successfully employed for long.
6
1d. § 436A. Instead of a court proceeding, the document of appointment is filed with
the Australian Securities Commission and appropriately made public.
7
The Australian Law Reform Commission contemplated only a supervisory function
for courts in the Voluntary Administration process. The Commission recommended that:
The court have a broad power to make orders for the effective operation of the
procedure. Although provision for extensive involvement of the court has been
avoided to simplify and reduce the time and expense of the procedure, the court
should have a role to ensure that the procedure operates in accordance with the
law.
GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, supra note 11, at 62.
1
SeegenerallyK.J.Bennetts, VoluntaryAdministration:ShapingtheProcessThrough
the Exercise ofJudicialDiscretion,3 INsOLv. L.J. 135 (1995) (identifying extent ofjudicial
powers in context of voluntary administration).
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interests if the company is unsalvageable by providing "a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets than would be effected by an
immediate winding up."' 9
Upon the appointment of an administrator, with certain exceptions, an
immediate moratorium on all claims is established.2" The company cannot
be wound up (liquidated),2' liens cannot be enforced22 (with one major
exception discussed infra), and owners or lessors of property being used by
the company generally cannot reclaim their property.23 The moratorium
facilitates the administrator's investigation of the company's affairs and
allows the administrator to prepare a report of recommendations for the
creditors, as well as stopping the proverbial race to the courthouse door.
There is, however, one very significant distinction between the
Australian moratorium and the American automatic stay. Upon appointment, an administrator must notify the holder of a lien (or a "charge" in
Australian parlance) over all or substantially all of the company's property
that his or her appointment has been made. 24 That creditor then has the right
to "enforce its charge" (foreclose on its lien) within a certain prescribed
period of time2 called the "decision period."2 6 Since a bankrupt company
cannot stop the lien holder from enforcing its interest,27 a secured creditor
effectively can opt out of an Australian bankruptcy proceeding and
foreclose on property following default.28 While it was initially feared that
19

GENERAL INsOLvENCY INQUIRY, supra note 11, at 1 59.
"0Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 440B (Austl.). This is of course consistent with
the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1995). Justifications for the moratorium
are similar to those for the American automatic stay. That is, the moratorium helps provide
for an orderly administration of the debtor's affairs (rather than promoting a race to the
courthouse door) and it preserves for the estate certain assets that may be necessary for
reorganization
to successfully occur.
21

Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 440A(1) (Austl.).

22

1d.
23

§ 440B.

1Id. § 440C.
24
1d. § 450A(3).
25

§ 441A. Although the provision governing secured creditors with a lien over
substantially all of the company's assets is by far the most significant exception, two others
do exist. First, secured creditors who have acted to enforce their rights prior to the
appointment of the administrator may also enforce their liens. Id. § 441B, F. Second,
creditors with a security interest in perishable property may similarly enforce their liens. Id.
§ 441C.
26
The decision period is typically ten to fourteen days after appointment. Ifthe creditor
fails to act within the decision period, it may still give notice pursuant to its security interest
that its interest will be enforced when the administration ends. Id. § 441 E.
2"Id. § 441A(3).
28
By contrast, Chapter 11 forces a secured creditor to participate in the bankruptcy
1d.

process unless one of two circumstances has been met which allows the creditor to lift the
automatic stay. The first circumstance is "cause," including the lack of adequate protection.
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secured creditors would routinely exercise their right to opt out ofproceedings, empirical evidence suggests that this has occurred less frequently than
had been anticipated.2 9
The appointment of an administrator serves to do something directly
opposite to the American debtor-in-possession provision-namely, suspend
the powers of the officers of the corporation ° and replace them with those
of the administrator.31 Any officer of the company who violates this section
may be held personally liable.32 The administrator is charged both with
operating and investigating the affairs of the company. Following the
appointment of the administrator, proceedings in court or in relation to the
company's property can only be initiated or proceed upon written consent

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1995). The second is when the debtor has no equity in the property
and the property is not needed for an effective reorganization. Id. § 362(d)(2).
29
Harmer, supra note 5, at 155. Perhaps one reason why banks have been reluctant to
routinely exercise this right is the fear of negative publicity in that their financial concerns
may not correlate with the financial well-being of the business community at large.
3
While directors do remain in office, their powers are greatly truncated. For example,
"[w]hile a company is under administration, a person (other than the administrator) cannot
perform or exercise, and must not purport to perform or exercise, a function or power as an
officer of the company, except with the administrator's written approval." Corporate Law
Reform Act, 1992, § 437C(1) (Austl.). This is the polar opposite ofthe United States debtorin-possession provision under Chapter 11, which allows the debtor to act as its own trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994). Rather, the director's primary role becomes to assist the
administrator. Directors are required to aid the administrator by delivering company books,
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 438B(1) (Austl.), by providing statements about the
company's business, property, affairs, and financial circumstances under § 438B(2), as well
as providing any other information the administrator reasonably requires. Id. § 438B(3).
3
"Id. § 437A(1). While a company is under administration, the administrator:
(a) has control of the company's business, property and affairs; and
(b) may carry on that business and manage that property and those affairs; and
(c) may terminate or dispose of all or part of that business, and may dispose of
any of that property; and
(d) may perform any function, and exercise any power, that the company or any
of its officers could perform or exercise if the company were not under
administration.
Id. Compare this provision with 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994), which provides that "[s]ubject
to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter,... a debtor-in-possession
shall have all the rights.., and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties,... of
a trustee serving in a case under this chapter."
32
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, §437E (Austl.). Ifan officer violates this provision
and the court determines that damage has been caused to a third party, "the court may
(whether or not it imposes a penalty) order the first-mentioned person to pay compensation
to the company or other person, as the case may be, of such amount as the order specifies."
Id.
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of the administrator3 3 or with leave of the court.34 In addition, any transfer
of shares is void absent court approval.35
The administrator acts as company agent.36 The operations entrusted
to the administrator include bringing and defending legal actions and
executing documents.37 There are two noteworthy exceptions to the ability
of the administrator to bring legal actions. First, once a company is
operating under administration, any guarantee of the company's liabilities
which has been given by a director of the firm or a relative of a firm's
director is not enforceable except by court order.3" Second, potentially
voidable transactions may not be challenged by an administrator. One
additional legal result of the company operating under administration is that
the administrator may be personally liable for debts incurred under his or
her administration, including debts for goods bought and for property
leased, used or occupied.4" This reflects a clear departure from general

33

As a general matter, any action on behalf of the company neither taken nor approved
by the administrator is void. Id. § 437D. There are, however, some exceptions relating to
certain34payments by banks. Id. § 437D(3).
Id. § 440D(1). Circumstances where a court will give leave are rare:
It maybe that where the company is insured against the liability the subject ofthe
proceedings, the administrator will ordinarily consent or the court will give
conditional leave, but outside this field it is hard to see situations where it would
be proper to grant leave, though doubtless there are such situations.
Foxcraft v. Ink Group Pty. Ltd., 15 A.C.S.R. 203, 205 (1994).
In addition, like the automatic stay under Title 11, this stay is not universally
applicable. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (1995) (providing for no stays against alimony,
child support, etc.), with Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 440D(2) (Austl.) (providing for
no stays
against criminal proceedings or prescribed proceedings).
35
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 437F (Austl.) ("A transfer of shares in a
company, or an alteration in the status of members of a company, that is made during the
administration
of the company is void except so far as the Court otherwise orders.").
36
1d. § 437B.
37
1d. § 442A(c).
38
Jd. § 440J(1).
39
However, a liquidator may challenge such transactions. Thus, the presence of such
transactions may encourage creditors to vote for a liquidation rather than for a deed of
arrangement
so that such transactions may be legally challenged.
40
1d. § 443A(1):
The administrator of a company under administration is liable for debts he or she
incurs, in the performance or exercise, or purported performance or exercise, of
any of his or her functions and powers as administrator, for:
(a) services rendered; or
(b) goods bought; or
(c) property hired, leased, used or occupied.
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agency law. As a general matter, however, the administrator is entitled to be
indemnified for these costs out of the company's property."
In terms of investigation, an administrator must call two meetings of
creditors shortly following appointment. The first meeting, which must be
called within five business days of the commencement of the
administration,4 2 is to confirm the administrator's appointment43 and, like
in the United States, to determine whether a committee of creditors should
be appointed to consult with the administrator and review his or her
reports.' A second meeting of creditors must be held within five days of the
convening period.45 The convening period is generally the period within
twenty-one days of the commencement of the administration.46
By the time of the second meeting-typically within a month of the
onset of the administration-the administrator, who has been running the
business since appointment, will have examined the financial status of the
corporation. The administrator will then report to the firm's creditors on
both the financial condition of the company47 and on the company's
potential long-term viability.48 If he or she deems the company viable, the

41

1d. § 443D.
1d. § 436E(2).
43
Id. § 436E(4). It is worth noting that creditors cannot vote to end the administration
at this point.
44d. § 436(E)(1), (F). Compare these provisions with 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994),
providing that "as soon as practicable after the order for relief under chapter 11 of this title,
the United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and
may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United
States 45trustee deems appropriate."
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 439A(2) (Austl.).
"Id. § 439A(5)(b). This period of time may be extended for cause. Id. § 439A(6). In
addition, the period is routinely extended to twenty-eight days if Christmas or Easter fall
within47the period. Id. § 439A(5)(a).
1d. § 439A(4)(a). This includes investigating anypast orpresent officerwho may have
committed misconduct or who may be otherwise accountable to the business. Id. § 438D.
48In giving notice of this meeting, the administrator must accompany the notice with
the following:
(a) a report by the administrator about the company's business, property, affairs
and financial circumstances; and
(b) a statement setting out the administrator's opinion about each of the
following matters:
(i) whether it would be in the creditors' interests for the company to execute a
deed of company arrangement;
(ii) whether it would be in the creditors' interests for the administration to end;
(iii) whether it would be in the creditors' interests for the company to be wound
up; and his or her reasons for these opinions; and
(c) ifa deed ofcompany arrangement is proposed-a statement setting out details
of the proposed deed.
42
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administrator will present the creditors with a deed of company arrangement.49 The creditors then vote on the deed.5
The vote as to whether a company should be liquidated or reorganized
is determined by a simple majority of creditors based on both the number of
creditors and the total dollar amount owed.5 If the creditors reject the deed
of arrangement, the corporation is liquidated immediately. If the creditors
approve the terms of the deed, however, the corporation has twenty-one
days to sign the deed, at which point the deed becomes effective and binding
upon most parties. 2 All unsecured creditors are bound by the deed,53 as is
the company,54 the company's officers and members,55 and the deed's
administrator. 6 Secured creditors who have voted for the deed are also
bound by it.57 However, a secured creditor who has voted against a deed that
is nonetheless confirmed by the majority is generally not so bound. Rather,
such a secured creditor may, as a general matter, enforce its rights in the
collateral. 8 However, the court will not allow such a creditor to enforce its
rights if it believes that doing so will have a "materially adverse" impact on
the purpose of the deed and where the secured creditor is adequately
protected. 9
At the meeting, the creditors may choose any of three options for the
deed of company arrangement." The first option is that the company
execute a deed of company arrangement specified in the resolution.6' There
are relatively few constraints on what the deed may contain, as the deed
should be a vehicle for the creditors in determining how best to deal with
the company's assets and liabilities.62 However, deeds of arrangement must

Id. § 439A(4).
49
Id.

50

§ 444A(3).

1d. § 439C(a).
5
]See CORPREG 5.6.21(2) (Austl.), available athttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num~regles/erl993nl35388/s26.html.
2
5 Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 444B(2) (Austl.).
53
1d. § 444D(1).
54
1d. § 444G(a).
55
1d. § 444G(b).
56
1d. § 444G(c).
57Id.
§ 444D(1).
5
SCorporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 444D(2) (Austl.).
59
1d. § 444F.
601d.
§ 439C.
61
1d. § 439C(a).
62As one commentator put it: "It is hoped that the procedure will allow for considerable
flexibility in order to enable the contents of the deed to meet the needs and circumstances of
the company and its various creditors. The deed may provide for debts to be compromised
or repayments to be delayed or paid in instalments." Phillip Lipton, Voluntary Administration: Is There Life After Insolvency for the Unsecured Creditor?, 1 INSOLV. L.J. 87, 92
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have certain prescribed conditions necessary to assure the ongoing operation
ofthe company.63 In addition, the deed must be implemented within twentyone days, unless an extension is obtained from a court.64 Once enacted, as
noted, the deed binds the company, 65 its officers, 66 members, 67 the deed's
administrator,68 and most of the company's creditors.6 9
The second option is that the administration should end.7" If the
administration is ended,71 the company reverts to its former position,
subjecting a company in poor financial standing to a possible receivership
or liquidation at the hands of its creditors. The third and final option is that
the company be wound up.72 If the company is wound up, it is deemed to
have been done so voluntarily.73

(1993).

63

Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 444A(4) (Austl.).
The deed must specify the following:
(a) the administrator of the deed;
(b) the property of the company (whether or not already owned by the company
when it executes the deed) that is to be available to pay creditors' claims;
(c) the nature and duration of any moratorium period for which the deed
provides;
(d) to what extent the company is to be released from its debts;
(e) the conditions (if any) for the deed to come into operation;
(f) the conditions (if any) for the deed to continue in operation;
(g) the circumstances in which the deed terminates;
(h) the order in which proceeds ofrealising the property referred to in paragraph
(b) are to be distributed among creditors bound by the deed;
(i) the day (not later than the day when the administration began) on or before
which claims must have arisen if they are to be admissible under the deed.
Id.

§ 444B(2).
64Id.
65
1d. § 444G(a).
66Id.
67

1d"

§ 444G(b)

68

1d. § 444G(c).
61Id. § 444D(1). It is, however, possible to terminate the deed. An administrator may
do so when it is no longer practicable to carry on the business. To do so, a creditors' meeting
may be called to decide whether the company should be voluntarily wound up. Id. § 445C,
D-F. 0
71d. § 439(b).
71
The administration typically ends for one of these reasons; however, procedural
matters, such as failure to hold the meeting, may bring about an end to the administration as
well. See generally § 435C(3)(a)-(g) (setting forth seven criteria by which administration
may end).
72
1d. § 439C(c).
73Id.

§ 491.
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III. SOME REORGANIZATION HISTORY AND A CHAPTER 11 PRIMER

Both Australian and American bankruptcy law have their roots in
English law, though each has markedly departed from the early English
model. To place this in context, I provide a brief overview of the development of bankruptcy law generally in England and of business bankruptcy
law in the United States.
A. The EarliestBankruptcy Laws
The earliest bankruptcy laws stem from Roman law. They were
distinctly pro-creditor in nature. Either an insolvent debtor or defrauded
creditors could demand transfer of the debtor's estate to the debtor's
creditors.74 Creditors had to elect one of their own to manage the estate.75
The manager's primary duty was to convey good title to the property to a
vendee. 76 The manager advertized the property for sale, sold the estate as a
whole to the highest bidder, and that bidder then succeeded to all of the
rights and obligations of the estate.77 Thus, while there were provisions to
aid creditors under Roman law, there was no attempt to provide for any
"rehabilitation" of the honest but unfortunate debtor.78
During the middle ages, the commercial cities in Italy began to develop
a form of collectivized debt collection to avoid fraud and facilitate equality
among creditors. 79 These laws were an adaptation of the Roman law's
bankruptcy procedure where the entire property of the debtor was divided
equally among creditors.8"
B. Early English Bankruptcy
The earliest statute on the subject ofbankruptcy in England was passed
in 1542.81 This statute provided certain rights to a merchant's creditors as

74MAX
RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 315 (1927).
7
5
1d.
761d.
77Id.
78
1d. at 315-16.

798 SIR W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229 (1925); see also JAN H.

DALHUISEN, The Development of Bankruptcy in Western Europe in the Middle Ages,
Renaissance,and Thereafter,Up to the Codification,in EUROPEAN BANKRuPTcY LAWS 11,
13 (I. Arnold Ross ed., 1974) (describing how Italian system established equality among
creditors).
80
1d.
8134 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.); HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 236.
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a group which they did not possess individually.8 2 These rights became
operable when a debtor committed certain acts-called acts of bankruptcy-which were thought to raise concerns over the creditors' ability to
use conventional debt collection mechanisms to compel repayment." The
law was not designed to aid the debtor in any meaningful way; rather, it was
largely geared toward the prevention of debtor fraud.84 When a debtor
committed a designated action which suggested the possible thwarting of a
creditor's ability to collect, the creditors could petition the Lord Chancellor
and request that the debtor's assets be gathered and distributed.8" If the
creditors were still not fully repaid as a result of this action, creditors
ability to resort to their other rights to attempt to compel
retained 8the
6
payment.
The first true act of bankruptcy-rather than for the prevention of
fraud-came in 1570 during the period of Elizabeth's reign. 7 The law
applied only to traders, 8 and it defined what should be regarded as acts of
bankruptcy. 9 The Chancellor was given authority to appoint an individual
with rights to exercise the powers of the Chancellor over the bankrupt's
person and property.90 These "commissioners" oversaw what amounted to
the liquidation of the debtor's assets and the distribution of the proceeds
from these assets to creditors.9" This included a power analogous to
pursuing fraudulent conveyances. 9' The law was distinctly pro-creditor in
orientation: it provided no opportunity for discharge,93 and a debtor who
committed fraudulent acts of bankruptcy faced possible imprisonment.94
The focus of most bankruptcy legislation in England in the 16th and
17th centuries was to increase penalties on non-compliant debtors.9"
& 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.).
HOLDSNWORTH, supra note 79, at 236.
8Id.
8234

83

85
1d.
86

1d.
8713 Eliz., c. 7 (1570). The first English statute employing the term "bankrupt" was
several years earlier. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.).
8
Others were treated merely as insolvents under common law.
" 9Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historyofthe BankruptcyLaws in the UnitedStates, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 9 (1995).
"Id. at 8.
91

1d.
9213 Eliz., c. 7, § 8 (1570).
9"The Act stated: "[i]f the creditors were not fully satisfied, they could gain remedy for

the residue of their debts, as if the act had not been made." Id. § 10. Further, "all future
effects of the bankrupt, whether lands or goods, are to be appointed and sold by the
for the satisfaction of his creditors." Id. § 11.
commissioners
94
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 237.
9Tabb, supra note 89, at 10.
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Debtors' homes could be invaded to assist in repayment, and non-compliant
debtors could be maimed.96
The notion of discharge first appeared in English law in the early 18th
century, when Parliament passed an act containing a provision allowing for
discharge.9 7 Bankrupt traders who surrendered to the commissioner and
conformed to his dictates or who were apprehended and then conformed
were discharged from all debts due at the "time as he, she, or they did
become bankrupt. 9 8 In addition, provisions allowed conforming bankrupts
not only to receive a discharge, but also to receive an allowance to provide
them an opportunity to again become productive members of society.9 9
The statute in effect at the time of the American Constitutional
°'This law largely followed
Convention was the 1732 statute of George II.1
the lead of the Act of 1705 in attempting to create incentives for compliance
from debtors. Discharge and retention of some property remained an option
for the compliant debtor; extremely harsh treatment remained the norm for
the non-compliant debtor.1" 1 Most English bankruptcy practices, including
the prospect of imprisonment for debt, were imported to America and were
generally being used in the Colonies prior to the framing of the
Constitution.0 2

"Id. (citing 21 Jam., c. 19, § 8 (1623); 1 Jam., c. 15, § 9 (1604)).
974 Ann., c. 17, § 7 (1705). Discharge was available, though, only to traders, and could
only be invoked involuntarily by creditors. See generallyJohn C. McCoid II, Discharge:The
Most ImportantDevelopmentin BankruptcyHistory,70 AM. BANKR.L.J. 163, 163 n.2 (1996)
(noting that bill was introduced in 1705, and this is date commonly cited, though it was not
enacted until 1706).
984 Ann., c. 17, § 7 (1705).
99
Id. § 8. Debtors could receive an allowance, not to exceed 200 pounds, of 5 pounds
per hundred of the net estate recovered, so long as creditors received at least 8 shillings per
pound owed. McCoid, supra note 97, at 167.
1091 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732).
10
Tabb, supra note 89, at 12. Though the laws remained pro-creditor throughout the
17th century in England, a different attitude regarding bankrupts began appearing. For
example, according to Blackstone,
a bankrupt was formerly considered merely in the light of a criminal ....
But at
present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws calculated for the benefit
of trade, and founded on the principles of humanity as well as justice; and to that
end they confer some privileges, not only on the creditors, but also on the
bankrupt or debtor himself
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1355-57 (William
Carey Jones ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1916) (1765); Tabb, supra note 89, at 11-12.
2
'° Vera Countryman, Bankruptcy and the IndividualDebtor-And aModest Proposal
to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 812 (1983).
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C. The ConstitutionalEra andBankruptcy

The Constitution gives Congress the right to establish "uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."' ' However,
it almost did not do that. This power was not included in the original draft
of the Constitution."0 4 The subject was not even discussed until very late in
the Convention when the Bankruptcy power was proposed as an addition to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.0 s The discussion of the subject of
bankruptcy at the Constitutional Convention does not provide much
guidance as to what was intended by the inclusion of the bankruptcy
provision in the Constitution. The only objection set forth at the Convention
to the bankruptcy power was based on a desire to insure that in this
country-unlike in England-debtors could not be put to death.106
The Bankruptcy Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution, is extremely brief. There are two primary arguments that have
been advanced for its brevity. The first is that the drafters intended to create
an entirely new federal system, and a congressional statute, not the
Constitution, was the most appropriate forum for the details to be fleshed
out.10 7 The second argument is that the American system of bankruptcy was

'° 3U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

8.

4
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
105CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY INUNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5 (1935).
1062 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (1911).
°TThis argument is based on the fact that under the Confederation, the states possessed
the sole authority to create bankruptcy laws. The Articles of the Confederation, art. II
(reserving to states all rights not expressly delegated to United States). The dissimilarity of
the bankruptcy laws between the states caused a multitude of problems. 3 STORY, supra note
104, at § 1101. Many of these state laws were passed in part to relieve debtors from
imprisonment, a problem which had grown due to the consequences of the war and other
monetary disorders. Kurt Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 215, 223-24 (1957). Records of the Prison Discipline Society reflect that in
1830, thousands of people had been imprisoned for debt, including 3,000 in Massachusetts,
10,000 inNewYork, 7,000 in Pennsylvania and 3,000 inMaryland, with an estimated 50,000
additional people in the northern and middle states. Richard Ford, Imprisonmentfor Debt,
25 MICH. L. REv. 24, 29 (1926).
The issue naturally arose as to whether a statute in one state could protect a debtor if
he or she ventured into another state. This question was often litigated in the years leading
up to the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., James v. Allen, 1 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1786)
(holding that order protecting debtor in New Jersey has no effect outside New Jersey); Miller
v. Hall, 1 U.S. 240, 242-43 (1788) (considering effectiveness of Maryland statute granting
discharge to debtor).
In THE FEDERALIST No. 42, James Madison discussed the importance of a national
bankruptcy code to prevent debtors from fleeing to other states with impunity:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
1043 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
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adopted with the English system in mind; therefore, the drafters just
assumed that the United States system would mirror that of England. 8
For most of the nineteenth century, there was no federal bankruptcy
law. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed in 1803;1"9 the Bankruptcy
Act of 1841.10 lasted even a shorter time. Both laws were intended to be
temporary. In 1867, Congress passed a bankruptcy statute which lasted until
1878.11 Each of these laws was passed in response to a particular economic
crisis." 2 Finally, in 1898, Congress passed a lasting (though frequently
amended), bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. n 3 This

with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.
The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of each state shall be proved, and the effect they
shall have in other States, is and evident and valuable improvement ....The
power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument ofjustice,
and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the
effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of
the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
An additional argument that a completely new law was intended stems from the fact
that the bankruptcy clause speaks of "uniform laws" rather than one "uniform law." This
leads to the inference that Congress was free to create different laws for different types of
debtors.
'This argument is based on the fact that the principal sponsors ofthe clause were both
trained in the English system. James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy: A Commercial
Regulation, 15 HARV L. REV. 829, 831 (1902). Therefore, the argument goes, the framer's
intent was to limit congressional power over bankruptcy legislation to law "analogous to the
English bankruptcy laws in force at the end ofthe eighteenth century." Samuel Williston, The
Effect of a NationalBankruptcyLaw Upon State Laws, 22 HARV. L. REV. 547, 551 (1909).
The English system at that time was confined to traders and provided only for involuntary
bankruptcies. Id.
'Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2
Stat. 248.
" 0 Act ofAugust 19, 1841, ch. 9,5 Stat. 440, repealedby Act of March 3, 1843, ch. 82,
5 Stat. 614.
"'Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealedby Act of June 7, 1878, ch.
160, 20 Stat. 99.
" 2 The Depression of 1793 brought about the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. The panics of
1837 and 1857 brought about the Acts of 1841 and 1867, respectively. David A. Skeel Jr.,
The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 322 (1999). For a full
discussion, See generally WARREN, supra note 105 (discussing comprehensively history of
bankruptcy in United States and analyzing such history with reference to three separate time
periods between 1789 and 1935).
'Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
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enactment was supplanted by the current Bankruptcy Code, enacted in
1978.'14

No concept of business bankruptcy was seriously considered under the
Bankruptcy Clause until 1820."' At that time, a debate began which
centered around whether Congress should have the power to legislate
regarding the bankruptcy of corporations.1 16 This was an issue since
corporations were, in all other respects, regulated by state rather than federal
law. 1 7 Proponents of federal regulation argued that a federal law was
necessary due to inconsistent state regulations, and that corporations were
sufficiently important to interstate commerce that Congress could regulate
their bankruptcies."' However, no bankruptcy law actually included
provisions intended to regulate business bankruptcy until the passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867. This Act, repealed in 1878, provided for limited
discharge of corporate debts on consent of the majority of the businesses'
creditors. 1 9
D. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first "permanent" bankruptcy law
in the United States. 2 The dominant forces behind the Act were business
organizations that lobbied on behalf of unsecured creditors.' However,
pro-debtor forces also played a role.1 22 The battle between the two groups
resulted in three important developments: First, the creation of an administrative structure providing only for paid referees and trustees; 21 second,
state exemption laws were incorporated into bankruptcy law; 124 and third,
while involuntary discharge was retained, a vote by creditors ceased to be
25
necessary to obtain a discharge.1
Prior to the 1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there
were essentially three methods for a business to restructure without
"4Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
enacting 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330).
1"Skeel, supra note 9, at 479.
1161d.
7
11
d. at 479-80 n.30.
"1 Id. at 480-81.

I"This provision was little used during the period that the Act was in force. KEVIN J.
DELANEY, STRATEGIc BANKRuPTcY 21 (1992).

"221°Skeel, supra note 9, at 325.
1d. at 328.
2
'2 1d. at 330.
1231d. at 334-34.
124
d. at 334-35.
1251d. at 335.
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liquidating. The first method was through a voluntary contract between the
creditors and the debtor. 26 The second was by making use of existing
bankruptcy laws, such as employing a bankruptcy sale. Assets at a
bankruptcy sale were typically purchased by creditors, but occasionally the
debtor would also "buy" the assets. 27 The third type of reorganization was
equity receivership. Equity receivership was a method in which a court
appointed a receiver to take control of a debtor's assets and sell them for the
benefit of creditors. By invoking diversity jurisdiction, the parties were able
to make use of the federal courts. 28 This third method was by far the most
frequently employed approach to business reorganization prior to 1934.
Perhaps the most notable use of the federal equity receivership was to
save the railroads from liquidation. With railroads, not only was a clear
public interest evident, but it was also the case that the railroads' assets had
little value if sold for scrap. Typically, a creditor would petition for
appointment of a receive' 29-often the existing management of the
firm-who would then continue to run the railroad. This arrangement would
typically be consolidated with foreclosure proceedings, and would conclude
with a judicial sale at which the creditors-and sometimes the
debtor-would become the purchasers under a new arrangement. While in
receivership, committees of various groups of creditors would be formed to
negotiate a new plan of reorganization with the new corporation. When the
assets were purchased at foreclosure, they were then placed with the new
corporation. The effect was that creditors' claims against the old firm would
be replaced by a stake in the new firm, effectively restructuring the debt
while the business remained operative. 30

26

' The problem with this arrangement was that dissenting creditors could not generally
be bound by a voluntary agreement.
'There were two primary problems with this approach: First, it carried the stigma of
a bankruptcy proceeding. Second, the bankruptcy proceeding could not continue ifa workout
was in progress and the debtor's business continued to operate.
"'28Edward H. Levi & James Wm. Moore, Bankruptcy and Reorganization:A Survey
of Changes, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1937).
'While equity receivership was generally obtained on a creditor's bill, as a practical
matter, the debtor was often the impetus for commencing such an arrangement, arranging for
a friendly
creditor to file the bill. Id.
130See, e.g., 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1100.11 [1] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
rev. 1996); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTcY 64-72 (rev. ed. 1993);
Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter11 Reorganizations:Reducing Costs, Improving
Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 584-86 (1993).
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E. The 1934 Enactment of§ 77B
The Depression was the impetus for the introduction of corporate
reorganization into existing American bankruptcy law.'3 1 In his February 29,
1932 address to Congress, President Hoover stated: "[t]he present Bankruptcy Act is defective in that it holds out every inducement for waste of
assets long after business failure has become inevitable. It permits
exploitation of its own process and wasteful administration by those who
are neither trulyrepresentative ofthe creditor nor the bankrupt.' 3 2 President
Hoover subsequently urged Congress to implement a system of corporate
reorganization. 133 The result was the proposal of H.R. 5884 in the first
session of the 73rd Congress. In 1934, this enactment became section 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. TM
Section 77B allowed a debtor to propose a plan of reorganization to be
approvedby its creditors.135 Confirmation required a creditor vote and court

approval. The required majority for creditor vote was two-thirds in dollar
amount of each claim affected by the plan.136 Court approval would3 be
acquired if the court found the plan to be fair, equitable, and feasible. 1

'The introduction ofa precursor of business reorganization laws in England appears
to have occurred with the 1870 amendment to the Companies Act of 1862. As the Chancery
Division stated inIn re Savoy Hotel Ltd.:
[S]ection 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870 introduced for
the first time a rudimentary ancestor of section 206, limited to compromises or
arrangements proposed between a company which was in the course of being
wound up, either voluntarily or compuslorily or under supervision, and its
creditors or any class of them. The compromise of arrangement had to be
approved by a three-fourths majority in value, but not in number, ofthe creditors,
and the section provided that if that happened the arrangement or compromise
should" . . . if sanctioned by an order of the court, be binding on all .such
creditors or class of creditors, as the case may be, and also on the liquidator and
contributories of the said company." The power was expressed to be in addition
to any other power of the court.
3 W.L.R. 441,447 (1981) (quoting The Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act, 1870, 33
& 34 Vict., c. 104, § 2 (Eng.)).
'I'S. Doc. No. 72-65, pt. 1 at X (1932).
H.R. Doc. No. 72-522 (1933).
34
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911 (transferred to scattered chapters by
Chandler Act of 1938, which was subsequently revised by the Bankrupcy Act of 1978).
1351d. § 778(a).
1361d. § 77B(e)(1). There are two distinct methods by which creditor vote can be
measured. The first is by dollar amount, where a creditor with a one hundred dollar claim
would have one hundred votes, and where a person with a one dollar claim has one vote. The
second 37method is to afford each creditor one vote irrespective of the size of its claim.
1 1d. § 77B(F)(1).
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F. The ChandlerAct and the Arrival of
ChapterX and ChapterXI in 1938
Changes to the business reorganization statute occurred with the
passage of the Chandler Act of 1938.131 Under the new law, section 77B was
replaced by Chapters X and XI. Chapter X, unlike section 77B, required the
appointment of an independent trustee in all cases where the debt exceeded
$250,000.139 The trustee was given broad powers. 4 ' Under Chapter X, a
plan could not be confirmed unless it was "fair and equitable." 4 ' In other
words, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, junior interests could not
receive anything until all senior classes were paid in full.
Chapter XI was designed primarily to allow small businesses to deal
142
with their unsecured debt. A Chapter XI debtor remained in possession,
and the debtor was the only entity that could propose a plan. 143 Any plan
that received a majority vote in number and in dollar amount of claims in
each class could be confirmed by the court, 4 4 as long as dissenting creditors
would receive at least as much in the reorganization as they would in a
145
liquidation.
By the 1970's, neither Chapter X nor Chapter XI were being used
exclusively in the manner in which Congress had intended. Chapter XI had
generally replaced Chapter X, which was effectively dead. 46
' This and other
circumstances led to the drafting of an entirely new bankruptcy law, and the
modem Chapter 11, codified at Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States
Code, emerged in 1978.147

'Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (revised by Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
'39Id. § 156.
140Id. § 167.
'41Id. § 221.
1421d. §§ 342, 343.
143See id. § 306.
144Id. §§ 361, 362.
'4This is commonly referred to as the "best interests" test.
146By the mid-1970s, less than ten percent of business reorganization cases were being
filed under Chapter X. BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 222 (1977); see also Lawrence P. King, The Business
Reorganization Chapterof the ProposedBankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to
ChaptersX X andXII, 78 COM. L. J. 429 (1973).
117The basic law remains from the 1978 Act, though the Code has been subsequently
amended. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
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G. Chapter11-A Primer
Chapter 11 encompasses numerous important substantive changes.
Perhaps the most significant of these changes is that the "debtor-inpossession" provision was substantially broadened. Prior to 1978, firms with
public debt or equity had a trustee appointed, and only privately held
companies could operate as debtors in possession. Under Chapter 11, it is
the norm for all companies to operate as debtors in possession. 148 This single
change provided incentives for publicly held companies to attempt
reorganization. With the debtor-in-possession in control, managers are far
more likely to keep their jobs during reorganization, and companies can
operate without the constraints of a trustee, and to a large degree, as long as
they are operating within the ordinary course of their business, without
constraints imposed by their creditors. 49
There were a number of other significant changes. Under Chapter 11,
the insolvency requirement for a business to enter bankruptcy was
abolished. A debtor need no longer be insolvent-either on a balance sheet
or an equity basis-to file for Chapter 11. As a result, there are now no
meaningful constraints on who can seekbankruptcy protection. In addition,
the Chapter 11 debtor is now given the exclusive right to propose a plan 5 '
for the first 120 days following the filing of a petition.' This period is
frequently extended further.1 12 By initially having the exclusive right to
propose a plan, the debtor has significant leverage in the negotiating process

4
' It is, however, possible in unusual cases in Chapter 11 to have a trustee or examiner
appointed.
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a), (c) (1994).
49
' As long as the debtor is operating within the ordinary course of its business, the
debtor-in-possession fully operates the business during the time the company is in Chapter
11. It has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to use, sell, or lease the property of the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1995). It can borrow on behalf of the debtor. Id. § 364. It can
generally assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts. Id. § 365. For a critique
of the changes brought by the advent of Chapter 11, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note
1.
'°A plan proponent must also provide, in addition to the plan, a court-approved
disclosure statement containing adequate information for a creditor to evaluate the plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
1
1d. § 1121(b). This is called the exclusivity period. If the debtor has not filed a plan
within 120 days, or if the plan has not been confirmed within 180 days, any party may file
its own plan. Id. § 1121(c). This was not the case under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
under which the debtor retained the exclusive right to propose a plan throughout the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. After the expiration of this period, a creditor could
propose its own plan and move to have it confirmed by the bankruptcy court.
'52See id. § 1121(d).
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within Chapter 1L' If neither the debtor's plan nor any other plan can
successfully be confirmed, it is likely that the firm's assets will be
liquidated.'5 4
The Code imposes thirteen requirements for a plan to meet in order to
be confirmed.'55 All are mandatory, except one-that the plan be consensual. i1 6 Creditors vote on a plan by class." 7 A favorable vote can be
obtained in either of two ways. First, any class of claimants whose interests
are unimpaired' 5 8 under the plan is automatically deemed to accept the
plan. 5 9 Alternatively, an impaired class may vote in favor of a plan. To do
so, the majority of creditors in the class must vote in favor of the plan, and
the claims of those voting for the plan must have a dollar value equal to at
60
least two-thirds of the dollar value of all of the claims in the class.
As long as the plan is consensual, the debtor's ability to retain
ownership is contractually determined based upon the agreement of the
parties rather than upon the rule of law. If the plan is not consensual,
however, and an impaired class rejects the plan, the plan can still be
confirmed in what is known as a "cram down"'' if certain requirements are
met. 62 These requirements include that at least one class of impaired
creditors who are not insiders has accepted the plan, 63
' that the plan does not
unfairly discriminate, that the "best interests" test is satisfied,'" and that the
plan is deemed "fair and equitable."' 65
'The desire to give the debtor leverage to negotiate is made clear in the legislative
history of the Code. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 1188 (1978). The fact that the debtor retained
the exclusive right to propose a plan under the old Chapter X, however, was deemed to give
it too much leverage. Thus a compromise was reached by Congress whereby the debtor would
be given initial exclusivity to propose a plan, but after a reasonable time without a plan being
first proposed and then confirmed, the right to propose a plan would be opened to all parties
in interest. See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 95-595, at 174 (1977).
"54See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1994) (allowing for conversion of case from one
under Chapter 11 to one under Chapter 7 of Code).
SS1d. § 1129(a)(1)-(13).
1561d. § 1129(a)(8).
'See generally id. § 1122 (classification of claims or interests). All holders of claims
and interests may vote on the plan. Id. § 1126(a) (stating that "holder of a claim or interest
allowed8 under section 502 of this title may accept or reject a plan").
MA class is said to be impaired unless certain specified requirements are met that
essentially
leave unaltered the rights of the party in question. Id. § 1124.
ls9Id. § 1126(t).
60
°1d. § 1126(c).
161Infra note 193.
162See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
63
1 1d. § 1129(a)(10).
'"The best interests test requires the dissenting impaired class of creditors to receive
at least6 as much as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. § I 129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
' SId. § 1129(b)(1).
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There are two methods of satisfying the fair and equitable requirement,
depending on the status of the creditor's claim. For dissenting secured
creditors, a plan is fair and equitable and can be crammed down if the
secured creditor effectively receives the full economic equivalent of its
secured claim. The Code provides three methods of accomplishing this.
First, a dissenting secured creditor may keep its lien and receive payments
on the plan's effective date equal to the amount of the secured claim;
second, the creditor may receive the indubitable equivalent of its claim; or
third, the property can be sold free and clear of the lien, with the creditor's
security interest attaching to the proceeds of the sale. This lien on proceeds
may then be treated under either of the other two options.166
For impaired, dissenting unsecured creditors, a plan is deemed to be
fair and equitable if it satisfies the terms of the absolute priority rule. The
absolute priority rule resulted both from an interpretation of the phrase "fair
and equitable," and as arule of contract law. Because creditors have priority
over equity in contracts under state law, it makes sense that for a plan to be
fair and equitable, this order of priority must be retained in a
reorganization.1 67 Hence the derivation of the absolute priority rule, which
holds that with respect to dissenting unsecured creditors, no junior class of
claimants can receive a penny in a cram down unless all senior classes are
paid in full. 68 Thus, a plan is fair and equitable with respect to an impaired
class if that class will receive full compensation69 for its allowed claims
1
before any junior class receives any distribution.
Taken in conjunction with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code, the
absolute priority rule provides for a distribution in a cram down that mirrors
the priority scheme established under state law.17 Also, when a company's
assets truly cannot meet its liabilities, the absolute priority rule, taken at
face value, appears to seriously call into doubt the chance of old equity ever

'6Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
167This idea stems from an old United States Supreme Court case called Northern
PacificRy. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502-05 (1913), discussed infra.
6
"[T]he holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will
not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property."
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
'Prior to the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the absolute priority rule went
even further in this regard. Under former Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, absolute priority
had to be maintained for all classes of creditors, irrespective of whether each class consented
to the plan. Under Chapter 11, absolute priority may be waived by a class that consents to do
SO.
" See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504 (1998) (providing order of applying proceeds from
disposition of collateral after default).
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participating in the reorganized debtor-presumably the very purpose for
the debtor entering bankruptcy protection in the first place.
IV. SOME SALIENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY LAWS
A. Bankruptcy Theory and the Australianand

American Models of Company Reorganization
Historically, there have been two primary views of the central purpose

of business bankruptcy. The first considers bankruptcy's core role as dealing
with an array of social problems that attend a company's mass financial
distress. This view may be called the "Social Benefit" approach. Chapter 11
in many respects reflects this view. The other approach-the Creditors'

Bargain 1 71-focuses

on the contractual relations of the parties and views

bankruptcy largely as a means to deal with common pool problems. The

Australian model more closely parallels this model.
1. The Social Benefit Approach and the American Model
The Social Benefit approach to corporate reorganization law takes as

its fundamental premise that bankruptcy plays a unique role in addressing
a vast array of complex issues that attend situations of financial distress.'72
These issues include such things as the ramifications of taxes, employees
and suppliers remaining unpaid, the existence of outstanding executory
contracts, and the presence of creditors threatening to levy and foreclose.
The breadth of these concerns necessitates looking beyond state foreclosure
laws, which are designed primarily to protect the interest of creditors.

"'71The name and substance of the "Creditors' Bargain" argument come from writings
by Thomas H. Jackson, beginning with his seminal article, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements,
and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
2
11 According to this view, state laws designed to deal with isolated
defaults are
fundamentally different in character from bankruptcy laws and cannot be used as a grounding
point for evaluating how bankruptcy law should function. The Social Benefit approach has
perhaps most frequently been espoused by Elizabeth Warren in recent years. A number of
Warren's writings touch on this theme. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, BankruptcyPolicy, 54 U.
CHl. L. REv. 775, 781-82 (1987) (arguing that bankruptcy pertains to distribution of losses,
not enhancement ofcreditors' collections) [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy];Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy PolicyMaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336 (1993)
(articulating competing goals that underlie bankruptcy system); see also Donald R. Korobkin,
Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 335
(1992) (arguing for "value based account" that considers both economic and non-economic
values of those affected by financial distress).
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Rather, goals in bankruptcy should include enhancing the value of a going
company (or at least preserving its going concern value), protecting certain
parties deemed socially worth protecting who are not well situated to protect
themselves, establishing a method to collectivize debt collection to make it
a more fair and efficient process, and determining how the company's
existing value will be distributed.'73
Consistent with the Social Benefit view of bankruptcy is the concept
that affording the debtor maximum opportunity to successfully reorganize
is the best way to address such attendant social concerns as loss ofjobs and
the impact on neighboring businesses and suppliers. 4
Chapter I 1-widely considered to be one of the most debtor-friendly
reorganization laws in the industrialized world-contains elements that
track the Social Benefit approach. Creditor interests are often perceived as
secondary in importance to reorganization and accompanying social
concerns. To aid reorganization, aspects of Chapter 11 are
redistributional.' This is reflected in a number of places. For example,

'Determining distribution includes determining who can best bear the risk of loss and
protecting those who are poorly situated to bear these costs, such as employees. For example,
Warren writes:
But the revival of an otherwise failing business also serves the distributional
interests of many who are not technically "creditors" but who have an interest in
a business's continued existence. Older employees who could not have retrained
for other jobs, customers who would have to resort to less attractive, alternative
suppliers of goods and services, suppliers who would have lost current
customers, nearby property owners who would have suffered declining property
values, and states or municipalities that would have faced shrinking tax bases
benefit from the reorganization's success. By giving the debtor business an
opportunity to reorganize, the bankruptcy scheme acknowledges the losses of
those who have depended on the business and redistributes some of the risk of
loss from the default. Even if dissolution is inevitable, the bankruptcy process
allows for delay, which in turn gives time for all those relying on a business to
accommodate the coming change.
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 172, at 787-88.
74
The legislative history to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code provides support for this
position. The House Report of the original committee working on Chapter 11 noted that
"[t]he purpose of a business reorganization case.., is to restructure a business's finances so
that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors .... It is
more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
'It is not clear that Chapter 11-unlike other forms of bankruptcy-was intended to
be redistributional. For example, corporate bankruptcy offers no "fresh start" by which debts
can be discharged and future income and certain other assets can be protected from prepetition claimants. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (1995) (providing that Chapter 11
"discharge" consists of exchanging old obligations for new obligations), with 11 U.S.C. §
727(a) (1995) (granting discharge to individual debtor).
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certain favored parties receive treatment in Chapter 11 that they could not
get under non-bankruptcy law, such as those who obtain heightened priority
on the basis of status, like employees, lessees, and those entitled to alimony
or child support benefits. 7 6 In addition, to ensure that a debtor can obtain
financing to continue its business, under certain circumstances, a new7
7
lender's lien can prime an existing properly perfected security interest,
something that cannot occur under state law. Thus, in Chapter 11, the rights
of certain parties can be sacrificed to other parties' interests in order to
facilitate the goals of rehabilitation and protection ofvarious favored parties
2. The Creditors'Bargainand the AustralianModel
The second major approach to corporate reorganization law is the
Creditors' Bargain. Adherents to the Creditors' Bargain approach view
bankruptcy as a second, procedurally distinct method of debt collection
from state law. Bankruptcy, under this view, should be employed in
situations where there are multiple defaults. Bankruptcy law should strictly
adhere to state law created substantive rights. 7 ' If not, the problem of forum
shopping will always remain. The focus of the Creditors' Bargain is largely
179
creditor protection, since creditors effectively own firms in bankruptcy.
Under this view, bankruptcy is needed because state law debt collection
rules are designed to deal with individual instances of a debtor's default and
do not deal effectively with multiple defaults. Thus, absent bankruptcy,

176

See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1995).
§ 364(d).
17'The United States Supreme Court has supported adherence to non-bankruptcy created
substantive rights in bankruptcy. In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56 (1979), the
Court criticized the use of "undefined considerations of equity" in bankruptcy to change
results dictated by non-bankruptcy law. The Court noted: "Congress has generally left the
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law." Id. at 54;
see also Raleigh v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 120 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2000) (stating that
"[c]reditors' entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying
substantive law creating the debtor's obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The 'basic federal rule' in bankruptcy is that state law
governs the substance of claims") (citations omitted).
79
' Creditors effectively own a firm in bankruptcy because the equity ofan insolvent firm
is essentially valueless while the going concern value of the firm can still be sold to pay off
some of the debt to creditors. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
BargainingAfter the Fall andthe Contoursof the Absolute PriorityRule, 55 U. CPi. L. REv.
738, 740-44 (1988) (examining absolute priority rule from perspective of renegotiation
problem).
77

1 Id.
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classic common pool problems would exist.180 Accordingly, bankruptcy's
fundamental purpose is to provide a solution to the common pool problem
by forcing creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding to enter a bargain to
determine how ownership rights in the assets should be allocated. This bargain-bankruptcy law-replicates the hypothetical bargain the creditors
would have made ex ante at the time they negotiated their positions were
they able to so contract.' The bargain has many advantages for creditors,
including the avoidance of strategic costs which would be part of a race to
the courthouse and the elimination of potential variances in amount of
recovery that would exist under state law. 82 For a variety of reasons,
including opt-out problems and the fact that the creditors of a given debtor
are likely to change over time, creditors cannot put such an agreement into
place individually.'83 The reduction in collection costs achievable through
bankruptcy is beneficial to secured and unsecured creditors alike.'84
Thus, under the Creditor's Bargain view, bankruptcy law benefits the
collective in several ways. First, it identifies rights that were entered into
under state law. Second, it stays individual recovery actions' 85 to prevent
dismemberment of the common pool and to maximize the total assets
available to be recovered. Finally, it sets up a process by which the assets

180THoMAS

H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 11-12 (1986)
(promoting concept that reorganization is form of sale to creditors); Alan E. Friedman, The
Economics of the Common Pool:PropertyRights in ExhaustibleResources, 18 U.C.L.A. L.

REV. 855 (1971) (proposing qualified, general, theoretical solution to common pool
problem). It is important to note in addressing common pool problems that the behavior of
each individual in acting selfishly in regard to the pool's assets is rational; however, this selfinterested behavior has the result of leading to sub-optimal results for the group when viewed
collectively.
'This bargain, ofcourse, must be hypothetical. In additionto the practical impossibilities ofhaving all creditors bargain amongst themselves, the identity of creditors changes over
time.
" The elimination of the risk of variance has value for risk-averse creditors. Jackson,
supra note 171, at 862.
8

'I d. at 866.

" Critics of the Creditors' Bargain have argued that it places economic gain as the
highest value, and its use of this collectivist methodology is merely a guise to detract
attention from the true values at its core. See, e.g., Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note
172, at 802-03. Warren argues that Douglas Baird's Creditors' Bargain approach
is not one of collectivism so much as one of economic rationality: the aim of
bankruptcy policy is to make certain that assets go to their highest-valued use.
Baird is at pains to avoid the economic lingo, but he cannot escape the
conclusion that the only value he protects is economic wealth maximization for
the bankrupt estate.
Id.

18511 U.S.C. § 362 (1995).
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of the common pool are distributed or put
to use according to the method
18 6
that the creditors as a group value most.
The Australian Model reflects an ideology analogous to the Creditor's
Bargain approach. The primary objective of Voluntary Administration is to
maximize the chance that the whole or part of a company may successfully
continue in business. However, if this is not possible, the secondary goal is
to provide a better return to creditors and members than would have been
achieved from the immediate winding up of the company.18 7 Although not
explicit in the first objective, each concern emphasizes the impact of a
reorganization attempt on creditors. 8 If the firm reorganizes, the effect will
be that the once again viable firm has addressed the problems that led to its
insolvency, thus allowing creditors to either be paid in full over a period of
time or to at least enjoy any going concern value associated with the
company's business. When the business is not viable as a going concern, the
return on the creditors' investment becomes the express purpose of the
liquidation. By reducing administrative costs through collective action,
creditors will receive more than they would have received in a straight
liquidation.'89
A number of elements in Voluntary Administration reflect a Creditors'
Bargain approach. For example, the moratorium preserves the common
pool, except where a holder of a lien on substantially all of the assets opts
otherwise. 9 ' If such a creditor is convinced that its rights will not be
impaired by an administration, it can always opt not to exercise this right.
On the other hand, a single creditor without dominant rights in the collateral
" 6jackson later revisited and expanded his Creditors' Bargain model. Thomas H.
Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature ofBankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
andthe Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989). In this Article, several new elements
were added to the Creditors' Bargain model to address the existence of redistribution in
bankruptcy for which the simple model did not properly provide. These elements include the
consensual sharing of common risk among creditors, the need to discourage self-interested
decisions made on the eve of bankruptcy, a recognition of certain non-monetary values
among the ownership and management of certain firms, and the presence of "random or
unsystematic distributional effects." Id.
"'Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 435A (Austl.); see also James Routledge, Part
5.34 of the CorporationsLaw (VoluntaryAdministration):Creditors'Bargainor Creditors'
Dilemma, 6 INSOLv. L.J. 127 (1998) (discussing interpretation of Voluntary Administration
laws).
"'The centrality of the creditors' role is explicit in the comments ofthe Australian Law
Reform Commission (ALRC). While the ALRC advocated a "constructive" approach to
corporate insolvency, providing for preservation of the business where appropriate, its focus
remained on creditors making an informed decision in an orderly environment about the
future of the company. See generally GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, supra note 11.
189
See Routledge, supra note 187, at 132-33.
90
See Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 441A (Austl.).
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cannot act on its security, thus preventing a single entity with a minority
interest from disrupting a process good for the whole. These Voluntary
Administration provisions are consistent with an ex ante bargain, where a
dominant creditor would have bargained for and had these rights outside
bankruptcy and would insist ex ante on their inclusion in bankruptcy.19 In
addition, the creditors determine the firm's future by majority vote. Thus,
whether a deed of arrangement, a termination of the administration, or a
liquidation is the end result of the administration, the outcome reflects the
sort of ex ante bargain one would expect of creditors were they so able to
contract.
B. Nine CriticalDifferences Between Voluntary
Administration and Chapter11
To illustrate why Voluntary Administration functions more effectively
than Chapter 11, 1will focus on nine distinct elements which distinguish the
two systems. These elements are:
(1) Australia has something akin to an insolvency requirement for
voluntary bankruptcy,"9 while the United States does not;
(2) An Australian vote on a deed of arrangement is determined by a
simple majority by number and dollar amount, while inthe United States,
claims are classified and voting on a plan of reorganization includes a
super-majority component;
(3) The Australian system is far less administratively costly than the
United States approach, in part because it does not require the ongoing
involvement of bankruptcy court personnel;
(4) Unlike the United States, Australian law contains no debtor-inpossession provision;
(5) The Australian system functions far more rapidly than Chapter 11;
(6) Directors of an Australian company are better shielded from personal
liability during the bankruptcy process than are their American counterparts, providing an incentive for Australian directors to place their firm
under bankruptcy protection early when the firm is more likely to still be
salvageable;
(7)The Australian administrator is personally liable for all debts incurred
by the company for services rendered, goods bought, or property hired
or leased during the administration;
(8) There is an opt-out procedure for Australian creditors with a security
interest in all or substantially all of the debtor's assets; the American
1
'See Routledge, supra note 187, at 132.
'9 2For purposes of this comparative analysis, I employ the term "bankruptcy" to mean
Voluntary Administration in the Australian context and Chapter 11 in the American context.
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bankruptcy system is mandatory upon all creditors, though certain
secured creditors may succeed in lifting the automatic stay; and
(9) Cram down'93 in Australia is far more limited than in the United
States.

C. The FirstSeven ComparativeFeatures
1. The Presencein Australia of SomethingAkin to an Insolvency Requirement
Australian law, unlike American law, has something close to an
insolvency requirement for company bankruptcy. Voluntary Administration
is to be employed by companies that are either insolvent or "likely to
become insolvent,"' 94 with insolvency defined in the liquidity sense of a
firm being unable to pay its debts as they become due.' By contrast, in the
United States, bankruptcy may be employed by any entity that may be a
debtor, 9 6 irrespective of whether there are common pool problems
warranting bankruptcy,' 97 since the Bankruptcy Code contains neither a
good faith filing requirement' 98 nor an express insolvency requirement.' 9

93

Cram down is an American term for the confirmation of a plan over the dissent of an
impaired class of creditors. While the term is not generally employed in Australian legal
parlance, I shall employ the term generally to refer to a plan of reorganization being binding
upon dissenting creditors in discussing both Australian and American law.
' 94Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 436A (Austl.).
'9Id. § 95A.
19611 U.S.C. § 101(13), (40), (41) (1995).
'9"See supra; Part II. F; see also, JACKSON, supra note 171, at 194-203 ("If bankruptcy's rules have been appropriately designed, most cases can be handled reasonably well
by creating a rebuttable presumption of appropriateness upon showing that there are multiple
creditors and a reasonable prospect of insolvency.").
'"See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 732,737 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding no insolvency requirement for voluntary Chapter 11 petition, and no good faith
requirement to file). However, certain courts have been willing to impose such a good faith
filing rule based on inferences made from other Code sections and kick the debtor out of
bankruptcy, subjecting it again to state law creditors' remedies. In re C-TC 9th Avenue
Partnership, 113 F.3d 1304, 1311 (2d. Cir. 1997) (dismissing filing of debtor who "enjoyed
no likelihood ofrehabilitation" and whose "main purpose in filing its Chapter 11 petition was
to stay the state court proceedings and to relitigate in the bankruptcy forum the matters that
had been settled in the state court," and holding that court need not rely on factors for
dismissal set out in section 1112(b), as "this list is illustrative, not exhaustive"); In re
Charfoos, 979 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1992) ("It is well-settled that even though Chapter 11
does not expressly so state, bad faith may serve as a ground for dismissal of a petition. It is
less firmly established though what actions may rise to the level of bad faith.") (citations
omitted); I re Humble Place Joint Venture, 936 F.2d 814, 816-17 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The
Bankruptcy Code provision that a Chapter 11 case may be dismissed 'for cause' has been
1
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The absence of an insolvency requirement has afforded American
debtors the opportunity to employ bankruptcy for offensive, strategic
purposes. In Australia, strategic use of Voluntary Administration is more
limited.0 0 In the United States, a solvent debtor may choose to file
bankruptcy as a business planning device-perhaps to attempt to force a
debt restructuring on an unwilling creditor by virtue of the automatic stay
and accompanying delays, perhaps to have the opportunity to reject
executory contracts, 2°1 perhaps to obtain the benefit of20a3 turnover order, 2
or perhaps for management to retain their jobs longer.
One difficulty, it should be noted, with the Australian approach of
requiring an insolvency component to enter bankruptcy is determining when
a company is in fact insolvent. Whether one defines insolvency on a
liquidity basis or based on whether all liabilities, appropriately valued,
exceed all assets appropriately valued, three obvious difficulties follow.
First, determining appropriate valuation is costly and time consuming.
Second, valuation is a difficult, inaccurate science. Finally, valuations
change over time. For example, different uses of assets may result in
different valuations. Thus, a "solvent" company today may be an "insolvent" company tomorrow.0 4

interpreted to include the lack ofgood faith in its filing."); Matter of Winshall Settlor's Trust,
758 F.2d 1136, 1137 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[G]enerally, an implicit prerequisite to the right to file
[a Chapter 11 petition] is 'good faith' on the part of the debtor, the absence of which may
constitute cause for dismissal. . . ."); see also Lawrence Ponoroff& F. Stephen Knippenberg,
The Implied GoodFaithFilingRequirement: Sentinel ofan Evolving Policy, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 919 (1991) (examining good faith doctrine and its operation in bankruptcy process).
199
By contrast, the prior American bankruptcy act, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, required
a showing "that the corporation is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature and
that it desires to effect a plan of reorganization." Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911,
912 (repealed 1978).
2
"°It
is not eliminated completely. For example, directors may opt for Voluntary
Administration to control who may ultimately liquidate the business if necessary or to delay
and eradicate the prospect of liability for potentially fraudulent transactions. See discussion
infraParts IV.B.4, IV.B.6.
20111 U.S.C. § 365 (1995).
2
.Seeid. § 542(a); see also United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 20203 (1983) (requiring I.R.S. to turn over property seized under tax lien to debtor-inpossession).
23
" See generally Daniel Keating, Offensive Uses ofthe Bankruptcy Stay, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 71, 80-128 (identifying five offensive reasons for filing bankruptcy and noting
associated costs of courts allowing offensive uses of bankruptcy stay).
24
Butsee Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimitsofBankruptcy, 63 TENN.L.REv.
487, 548 (1996) (arguing that some of difficulties of insolvency requirement could be
ameliorated by statutory creation of rebuttable presumption of insolvency).
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2. Classificationand Voting
Voting for an Australian deed of arrangement is determined by a
simple majority of creditors both by number and by dollar amount at stake.
Claims are not classified. By contrast, the American voting system is done
by classification of claim, 2" and there is a super-majority component
required for a class to consent to a plan. As noted, in the United States,
unless a class is unimpaired, for it to vote in favor of a plan, both the
majority of creditors in the class must vote in favor of the plan and their
claims must have a value equal to at least two-thirds of the value of all of
the claims in the class.2 °6
Classification has a significant advantage and a significant disadvantage. The advantage is that it allows each group of similar claimants to make
decisions about what is in the best interest of its own class, without allowing
an individual malcontent to destroy a generally beneficial deal. The
disadvantage is that there is a constant risk of gerrymandering the classes
for the purpose of influencing the voting.207 Gerrymandering can occur in
either of two ways. First, it can happen when different claims are put in the
same class. In this scenario, the vote of the majority may not in fact
represent a decision that is in the interest of a particular group. 20 The
second possibility is when similar claims are put in different classes. The
concern here is that a class would be artificially created to satisfy the
requirement that one impaired class of non-insiders has voted for a nonconsensual plan.20 9 The Bankruptcy Code expressly forbids only the former,

2

°Note that this is not by classification of creditor. A single creditor may have more
than one claim. The classic example is an undersecured creditor, who has a secured claim up
to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the remainder. This creditor will vote
and its unsecured claim.
both its
206secured
The super-majority voting requirement in Chapter 11 deviates from the simple
majority requirement of the old Chapter XI. The 1973 Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws recommended continuing the simple majority requirement for the law that
would ultimately become Chapter 11. H.R. DOc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 29 (1973).
2
.Gerrymandering is defined as "the practice of dividing any geographical or
jurisdictional area into political units... to give some group a special advantage." BLACK'S
696 (7th ed. 1999).
LAW DICTIONARY
2
1'For example, if secured and unsecured creditors were lumped together, the secured
creditors'
vote would not reflect the interests of the unsecured creditors, and vice versa.
209
See II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1994). The concern here is that a creditor who could
dominate a voting class and reject the plan may effectively be disenfranchised by separate
classification. See generally Peter E. Meltzer, Disenfranchisingthe Dissenting Creditor
Through Artificial ClassificationorArtficialImpairment,66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281 (1992)
(demonstrating through hypotheticals possibility of disenfranchising dissenting secured
creditor).
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putting dissimilar claims in the same class. The Code does not directly
address the latter."'
Professor David Skeel has argued for the benefits of a simple majority
voting scheme in Chapter 1 1."'According to Skeel, super-majority voting
is appropriate only where there is a fear that corporate decisions will by
their nature affect majority and minority shareholders differently." 2 This is
not true in Chapter 11, since each class member will receive a proportionate
share of the distribution. While the benefits of a super-majority scheme in
Chapter 11 are nominal, the costs are not. A creditor who wished to block
voting would have to buy more than half of the class at stake, and a party
that did this would be unlikely, presumably,
to adopt a position disadvanta21 3
geous to that of the class as a whole.
21011

U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994) ("[A] plan mayplace a claim or an interest in aparticular

class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or interests of
such class."); see, e.g., Matter of Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.
1991) ("[O]ne clear rule... emerges from otherwise muddled caselaw on § 1122 claims
classification: thou shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an
affirmative vote on a reorganization plan."); In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1526 (9th Cir.
1996) ("[A]bsent legitimate business or economicjustification, it is impermissible for Debtor
to classify [a] deficiency claim separately from general unsecured claims."); In re Boston Post
Road Ltd. P'ship, 21 F.3d 477,482 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Classifications designed to manipulate
class voting must be carefully scrutinized. There is potential for abuse when the debtor has
the power to classify creditors in a manner to assure that at least one class of impaired
creditors will vote for the plan, thereby making it eligible for the cram down provisions."
(quoting Hanson v. First Bank of South Dakota, N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987)))
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir.
1993) ("[I]t seems clear that the Code was not meant to allow a debtor complete freedom to
place substantially similar claims in separate classes.... A debtor could then construct a
classification scheme designed to secure approval by an arbitrarily designed class of impaired
claims even though the overwhelming sentiment of the impaired creditors was that the
proposed reorganization of the debtor would not serve any legitimate purpose. This would
lead to abuse of creditors and would foster reorganizations that do not serve any broader
public interest."); In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) (allowing
classification based on desire to create consenting class of creditors). But see In re Pine Lake
Village Apartment Co., 19 B.R. 819, 830-31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (disallowing creation
of separate classes of unsecured creditors in order to obtain accepting class); Bruce A.
Markell, Cluelesson Classification:TowardRemovingArtificialLimitson Chapter11Claim
Classification, 11 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 3 (1994-95) (arguing that "courts should permit any
classification proposed by a [C]hapter 11 plan unless a dissenter can establish that the
challenged classification would combine, to the dissenter's detriment, creditors or
shareholders with different non-bankruptcy liquidation priorities").
211
David Arthur Skeel Jr., The Nature and Effect of CorporateVoting in Chapter11
Reorganization
Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 515-18 (1992).
212
The classic case would be a closely-held corporation.
23
" Skeel, supra note 211, at 515-16. Because majority voting would limit but not
eliminate strategic behavior, Skeel argues that the fiduciary duty standard contained in 11
U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1994) should be retained and employed when a blocking creditor's vote
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The Australian system approximates American corporate voting
outside of bankruptcy. As a general matter, American state corporation law
provides for a one vote per share approach to corporate voting.21 4 This
reflects the fact that each vote should correlate with the financial stake in
the firm of the voter. Similarly, by employing simple majority voting,
Voluntary Administration accomplishes two things. First, by requiring a
simple majority in amount, the vote will necessarily correlate with the
financial stake of the voter. Second, by requiring a majority in number, it
considers the rights of small creditors who may be the most adversely
affected by the bankruptcy and whose interests may be contrary to those
with the greatest value at stake. Thus, by requiring a simple majority, the
Australian approach to voting provides the benefits of a vote without the
costs that accompany a super-majority requirement.
3. Voluntary AdministrationIs Administratively Less Costly Than Chapter
11
Voluntary Administration was expressly designed to be cost-effective
and administratively convenient. 1 5 These goals are achieved in several
ways. In Australia, unlike in the United States, there is no regular involvement of court personnel in business reorganization cases. A company
entering Voluntary Administration need not file documents with a court, and
courts are not routinely involved in the process, though they may exercise
a supervisory and facilitory function. 216 Likewise, courts do not need to

reflects an interest at odds with the rest of the class. Id. at 516-18. Section 1126(e) states:
"On request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may designate any
entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited
or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
1126(e)
(1994).
214See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1991) (providing one vote to each
stockholder for each share of capital stock held by shareholder). However, corporations can
generally alter this one vote per share model should they so choose. For an overview of
corporate voting rules, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate
Law, 26
J.L. &ECON. 395, 399-400 (1983).
21
lThis is a distinctjuxtaposition to the state of Australian affairs prior to the enactment
of Voluntary Administration. In his second reading speech to the Act on November 3, 1992,
then Attorney-General Duffy stated about existing Australian insolvency: "It is often said of
our insolvency laws that they are so inflexible and expensive to use that it is impossible for
a company to seek to recover through an insolvency administration without facing the
likelihood of liquidation." TOMASIC &WiITFORD, supra note 15, at 161.
26
The Court has general supervisory powers to make such orders as it deems
appropriate under Part 5.3A. of the Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 447A (Austl.). In
addition to these general powers, the court has a few specific powers. It can (1) make orders
during the administration for the protection of creditors (§ 447B); (2) declare whether the
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confirm the deed of arrangement for the deed to be effective. 2 17 Court
appearances are infrequent or may never occur. The administrator, rather
than ajudge, is the key player in the administration. The absence of ongoing
court involvement makes Voluntary Administration not only more costeffective than Chapter 11, but also provides greater latitude for the parties
to work out a settlement amongst themselves.
4. No Debtor-in-possessionin Australia
In Australia, there is no counterpart to the American debtor-inpossession.2 " Rather, an administrator takes control of the business and
displaces existing management. Administrators are typically independent
chartered accountants. The benefits of such a system include ensuring that
when the bankruptcy is in whole or inpart endogenously rather than entirely
exogenously caused,219 those who have
lead the firm into bankruptcy do not
220
continue to run the firm post-filing.
appointment of an administrator or deed is valid (§ 447C); (3) give certain directions to the
administrator (§ 447D); (4) supervise the administrator and replace the administrator when
avacancy occurs (§ 447E); (5)terminate a deed for limited reasons (§ 445D); (6) vary or void
a non-complying deed (§ 445G); and (7) control or restrict certain creditor's ability to vote
on a deed
(§ 600A). Id. §§ 447B, 447C, 447D, 447E, 447G, 600A.
217
Courts typically do not review deeds of arrangement unless a party in interest
requests that they do so.
2
'Interestingly, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created
by Congress in 1970 to examine the existing bankruptcy laws, proposed that a trustee be
appointed for any corporate bankruptcy case involving 300 or more security holders and
debts of at least $1,000,000, unless a trustee was found to be unnecessary or the expense
would be "disproportionate to the protection afforded." H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 221
(1973). As noted, however, when Chapter 11 was ultimately enacted, the debtor acting as
debtor-in-possession was the established norm, and a trustee can only be appointed "for
cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of
the debtor
by current management." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
21
Perhaps most notably in recent years, Bradley and Rosenzweig have argued
that this is a common occurrence:
More fundamentally, fashioning a firm's capital structure obviously involves
certain choices regarding the use of debt financing. To the extent that managers,
influenced by the availability of bankruptcy protection, choose to burden their
firms with 'too much' debt or 'impossible' debt-payment obligations, financial
distress is hardly an entirely exogenous event. On this view, corporate bankruptcy frequently is significantly endogenous, chosen by, rather than imposed
upon, corporate managers.
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 1, at 1047.
There is evidence, however, that in larger Chapter 11 cases management may change,
though the Board of Directors does not. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held

Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669 (1993) (examining origins of conflict among manageHeinOnline -- 2001 Utah L. Rev. 223 2001
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Thejustification for the debtor-in-possession law has historically been
that it increases the likelihood of a successful reorganization. If managers
believe that their jobs will be preserved in Chapter 11, they will be more
likely to put their company into Chapter 11 at an early stage while the
company may still be viable.21 In addition, the argument goes, those most
2 22
familiar with the company will continue managing it.
One risk inherent in the debtor-in-possession law is that a debtor-inpossession may be tempted to opt for high risk strategies on the basis that
it has nothing left to lose by doing so, but potentially a substantial amount
to gain. This strategy-surely tempting to the debtor-in-possession of any
insolvent company-contains moral hazards analogous to those commonly
associated with limited liability. Under state law, equity investors lose their
investment before debt investors do. With an insolvent debtor, the equity (in
charge as debtor-in-possession) has nothing left to lose. Since the equity of
an insolvent debtor does not bear the burden of its risky behavior, an
incentive is created for the equity holders to direct a firm to behave in an
excessively risky fashion.
In addition to avoiding such improper investment incentives, the
Australian system's absence of a debtor-in-possession law eliminates the
inherent conflict in fiduciary obligations that exist in the United States. A
debtor-in-possession, with all the rights and powers of a trustee in most
instances, is responsible during the bankruptcy for, among other things,
operating the business, assuming and rejecting executory contracts, and
proposing a plan of reorganization. By doing so, the debtor-in-possession
makes numerous decisions that affect the value and viability of the business.
These decisions may harm some parties and benefit others. Yet a debtor-in-

ment, creditors, and shareholders in bankruptcy reorganizations); Stuart C. Gilson,
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate
Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 355 (1990) (describing
processes underlying both private restructuring and Chapter 11 restructuring of financially
distressed corporations); Anna Y. Chou, CorporateGovernance in Chapter11: Electing a
New Board, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 559 (1991) (analyzing shareholders' election rights in
context
of electing new board after Chapter 11 filing).
221
'See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 231 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6191 (indicating that debtor-in-possession law is beneficial because debtor maintains
control over future of business and therefore will act to benefit corporation).
22
The Bankruptcy Code does provide some limited safeguards to control management.
Committees can be appointed to oversee the activity of the debtor-in-possession. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1102, 1103 (Supp. 2000). Likewise, trustees or examiners can be appointed for cause. Id.
§ 1104. However, the appointment of a trustee is a rare occurrence. See generally Barry L.
Zaretsky, Trustees and Examiners in Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REv. 907, 910-11 (1993)
(contending that broader use of third party trustees and examiners would be beneficial to
Chapter 11 process).
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possession simultaneously owes fiduciary obligations to a number of
parties-including creditors, officers, directors, and equity-whose interests
rarely align.223
While the absence ofthe debtor-in-possession provision has significant
advantages for the Voluntary Administration, some concerns about the
appointment of the administrator remain. The directors of the Australian
company generally determine who becomes the administrator ofa Voluntary
Administration, a benefit directors are not given in a liquidation. This
provides certain potential for abuse. Directors may be tempted to choose
"friendly" administrators. For example, a director who knows that the
company cannot succeed in Voluntary Administration may nevertheless be
tempted to move in that direction fully expecting that liquidation will
eventually occur. In doing so, the director gains the benefit of influencing
who the liquidator will ultimately be.224
5. Voluntary Administrations Are Resolved Far More Quickly Than
Chapter11 Cases
The Australian process moves quickly. As noted, the first meeting of
creditors must be called within five business days of the commencement of
the administration. 225 The company's ultimate disposition is typically
decided within a month of the onset of the administration, as the second
meeting of creditors must be held within 5 days of the convening period,
which is generally the period within 21 days of the commencement of the
administration.226 This rapid process-sometimes criticized as too
rapid 22 7-- results in several key benefits. Most obviously, this process results

' 2 For a thorough discussion of the conflict of interests problem, see Raymond T.
Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: FiduciaryDuties,
Business Judgment, Trustees andExclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1 (1989).
2 24
This risk is offset, however, by the fact that creditors have a right to replace an
administrator appointed by directors. Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 436E(4) (Austl.).
2
SSee supra Part II, Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 436 (E)(2) (Austl.).
226§ 439A(5) (Austi.). This period of time may be extended for cause. Id. § 439A(6).
In addition, the period is routinely extended to twenty-eight days if Christmas or Easter fall
within the period. Id.
227
See, e.g., Report of the Companies & Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate
Voluntary Administration Final Report, at 31 (June 1998) ("Under the current law, the time
limits for holding the major meeting are often inadequate for administrators to conduct a
proper investigation of large companies whose affairs are complex or of small companies
whose records are in disarray."); Michael Rose & Larelle J. Law, VoluntaryAdministrations:
Will They Work?, 3 INSOLv. L.J. 11, 12-13 (noting chaotic nature likely to prevail early in
administration and that administrator may not have timeto provide creditors with meaningful
information). However, the time periods under current law may be extended for cause. See
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in a speedy determination of the relevant parties' rights. A related point is
that because of the speed of the process, there is some incentive for a
secured creditor not to opt out of the moratorium period that would not exist
if the administration-and thus the moratorium period-were longer.228
Finally, the speed of the Australian system decreases the debtor's incentive
to employ bankruptcy for strategic purposes by using extended delay as a
tactic in negotiation.
By contrast, the American bankruptcy system takes time. Estimates of
average confirmation times in Chapter 11 vary greatly, but no estimate
suggests an average of less than 10 months.229
The American Bankruptcy Code typically allows the debtor the
exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization for 120 days following

Corporate
Law Reform Act, 1992, § 439A(6) (Austl.).
22
'Legal Committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Voluntary
Insolvency AdministrationDiscussionPaper,at 22 (January 1997).
229
The major studies addressing time issues in Chapter 11 cases are summarized in
Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter]] Too Favorableto Debtors?Evidence
from Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1532 (1997). Eisenberg and Sundgren use as their base
for statistical purposes the combined results of two significant studies utilizing the same
methodology. Id. at 1547. Lynn LoPucki studied all Chapter 11 cases in the Western District
of Missouri from October 1979 until October 1980. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full
Control-SystemsFailureUnder Chapter]] ofthe Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J.
99 (1983). Jerome Kerkman studied a random sample of Chapter 11 cases from the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in 1982. Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtorin Full Control:A Casefor
Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159 (1987). The combined LoPuckiKerkman data suggests a mean time for confirmed reorganization plans (including liquidating
plans) of 10.7 months, with a median time of 10 months. Eisenberg &Sundgren, supra note
229, at 1557. However, other studies cited by Eisenberg and Sundgren suggest that the time
is in fact substantially longer. Id. at 1558. In Ed Flynn, StatisticalAnalysis of Chapter11
(1989) (unpublished) (on file with Eisenberg & Sundgren), the mean confirmation time was
found to be 24.6 months and the median confirmation time 21.1 months. In Susan JensenConklin, Do Confirmed Chapter11 PlansConsumate? The Results of a Study andAnalysis
of the Law, 97 CoM. L.J. 297, 319 (1992), the median confirmation time was found to be 22
months, while in Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, MeasuringChapter11: The Real World
of 500 Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 119, 152 (1996), the authors found a median of
13.1 months. In a separate study by Lynn LoPucki examining the Western District of
Wisconsin in 1987 and 1988, the mean and median times were found to be 19.4 and 17.5
months respectively. LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 1,at 741-42. See generally Eisenberg &
Sundgren, supranote229, at 1557-58 (asking whether Chapter 11 time allowances are overly
favorable to debtors).
Even when no plan is confirmed, Chapter 11 is still a lengthy ordeal. Eisenberg and
Sundgren report that the combined LoPucki-Kerkman data suggests a mean time for
unconfirmed plans in Chapter 11 of 8.6 months and a median of 7 months. Fenning and Hart
report a median of 6.7 months from filing to dismissal and a median of 9.4 months from filing
to conversion. See Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 229, at 1559 nn.1 10-111.
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the date of filing.23 ° This period of time is routinely extended,231 and a
debtor's ability to threaten to extend this time is a strategic element in the
negotiations.
By extending its exclusivity period, a debtor may be able to effectively
hold a creditor hostage, thus encouraging a settlement that a creditor would
not otherwise agree to were the process quicker. The extreme length of time
in which cases languish in Chapter 11 has been a regular element of the
debate on Chapter I l's vitality.232 General business uncertainties tend to
prevail during a Chapter 11 case, and delays in resolving the issues at stake
are costly. Administrative 3 and creditor expenses234 increase overtime, and
the movement of assets to more productive uses is delayed.235 By moving
quickly, the Australian system avoids many of these problems.
The speed of the Australian process has been criticized for failing to
provide sufficient time for administrators to put together an accurate picture
of the debtor, particularly in complex cases. The difficulty is mitigated,
however, by the presence in Australian law of a limited opportunity for
extensions of time when needed. The twenty one day period during which
the meeting of creditors must be convened can be extended for cause but
only by court order upon application of the administrator, and importantly,
this application must be made within the original twenty-one-day
timeframe.2 36 The result in Australia, unlike in the United States, is that the
possibility of strategically-requested repeat extensions does not exist.

23011 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994). Pursuant to section 1121(c), a competing plan may be

filed if"1) a trustee has been appointed...; 2) the debtor has not filed a plan before 120 days
after the date of the order for relief...; or 3) the debtor has not filed a plan that has been
accepted, before 180 days after the date of the order for relief." Id. § 1121.
231

1d.

32

§ 1121(d).

For example, it has been argued that the primary problems associated with Chapter
1 1-excessive expense, too much debtor control, poorperformance once companies emerge,
and the high rate of recidivism-all stem from the excessive time it takes to reorganize in
many Chapter
11 cases. Lynn M. LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 1, at 730-31.
3
1 LoPucki, Agenda, supra note 1, at 576.
" 4This includes not only out of pocket expenses-like legal fees-but also the fact that
unsecured and undersecured creditors do not obtain interest in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 506
(1994); United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers ofInwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S.
365, 372-73 (1988).
23
Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 229, at 1543.
" 6Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 439A(6) (Austl.).
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6. PotentialDirectorLiabilityfor Guaranteesand Voidable Transactions
The potential liability of a company's directors may be delayed,
limited, or eliminated when the company enters Voluntary Administration.
While certainly not without disadvantages, the result is that directors do not
have certain negative incentives which could lead them to avoid or delay
employing Voluntary Administration. Early intervention is likely to lead to
two benefits. First, the likelihood of salvaging the company increases when
remedial measures are taken early rather than late; and second, the sooner
measures are taken to deal with a troubled firm's problems, the greater the
likelihood that the firm's creditors will be able to recover their value.
There are two separate legal rules that impact director liability in this
regard. First, unlike American law, where the general rule is that the
automatic stay is not routinely extended to other parties,237 the moratorium
under Voluntary Administration does extend to directors and their family
members who have guaranteed obligations. This moratorium exists only
during the period of the administration. Second, potentially voidable
transactions may not be challenged by an administrator, but they may be
challenged by a liquidator.238
The justification for each of these rules is to create incentives for a
troubled firm to be placed in Voluntary Administration. A director who has
personally guaranteed obligations of the company will be less likely to
appoint an administrator when necessary if the guarantee will become
enforceable immediately upon appointment. 23 9 By eliminating this prospect,
directors will be more inclined to make decisions about Voluntary
Administration based on what is best for the company and its creditors.2

237

See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 120 (4th Cir. 1988)
(asserting that stay does not routinely extend to guarantor of debtor); 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 362.04 (stating that stay "does not protect separate legal entities such as
corporate
affiliates, partners in debtor partnerships or codefendants in pending litigation").
238
1t is worth noting, however, that the administrator in reporting should indicate
whether any transactions appear potentially fraudulent. The presence of such transactions may
encourage creditors to vote for aliquidation where such transactions can be challenged, rather
than for a deed of arrangement.
239
Corporate Law Reform Bill of 1992, Explanatory Memorandum 529. There is an
argument that directors have an incentive to move quickly anyhow, because if a company
outside voluntary administration continues to lose money, potential losses on guarantees may
continue to rise. See PHILIP CRUTCHFIELD, CORPORATE VOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION LAW
11 (2d ed. 1997).
24
A risk does exist, however, that directors will use the moratorium period to dissipate
their wealth and make themselves judgment proof. Although legally such transfers are
voidable, tracing them can be a difficult and expensive process. See, e.g., Legal Committee
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In like fashion, the desire to avoid scrutiny of a potentially voidable
transaction may push a director to place a company under the supervision
of an administrator rather than a liquidator. A second justification has been
proffered for the rule regarding voidable transactions. Voluntary Administration was designed to provide a mechanism for reviving companies, not
for pursuing questionable past transactions. The drafters of the law thus
deemed it inappropriate to allow administrators to routinely investigate such
prior transactions.24 '
7. PersonalLiability of the Administrator
In America, a debtor-in-possession of an insolvent company is subject
to few constraints. And, as noted, the debtor-in-possession has little
incentive to make appropriate cost-benefit determinations because it does
not bear the burden of its financial errors. Creditors bear the cost of an
insolvent entity losing additional money, but the equity holders can benefit
by a risk that is ultimately rewarded. The resulting risk-reward incentives
are improperly balanced. Such difficulties are far more limited in Australia.
In Australia, following his or her appointment, an administrator is
personally liable for the debts incurred by the company for services
rendered, goods bought, or property hired or leased. This personal liability
is subject to a right to indemnification from the company's assets.242 The
administrator's right to indemnity generally has priority over unsecured
creditors, 243 but not over secured creditors. This has at least two positive
ramifications. 2" First, it assures creditors of a strong likelihood of
repayment.245 This is a particularly important assurance for trade creditors,
whose willingness to continue doing business with a debtor is frequently a
necessary element in any hoped-for reorganization. Second, it provides at
least one limitation on excessively risky behavior. The administrator-the
person running the bankrupt business, just as the debtor-in-possession does
in the United States-continually runs the risk of bearing the cost of his or

of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, CorporateVoluntary Administration
Report, at 102 (June 1998) (stating that in some instances directors use moratorium time to
dissipate
their personal wealth).
241
See CRUTCHIELD, supra note 239, at 37.
242
Corporate Law Reform Act, 1992, § 443A(1), (2) (Austl.).
243

24

1d. § 556.

The downside of personal liability, of course, is that it may cause hesitation in
someone asked to be an administrator.
245
The Law Reform Commission stated that it is "essential to provide [a reasonable
assurance of payment] to creditors by requiring the administrator to be personally liable."
GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY, supra note 11, at 88.
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her decisions, as he or she may be responsible for any liability he or she
incurs that exceeds the value of the unencumbered assets of the firm. While
the administrator is given certain protections by being afforded a lien over
all unencumbered assets of the debtor ahead of unsecured creditors, the
result is that certain constraints are placed on the company's operation,
which may impact losses ultimately borne by creditors. That is, the idea
behind the potential personal liability of an administrator is to encourage the
administrator to be conservative in incurring new obligations or allowing
the debtor to continue operating at a loss.
D. Issues Eight and Nine-The Question of Creditor Control
While each of the nine elements identified as distinct differences is
significant, the last two-the opt out option for certain secured creditors and
the limitations on cram down in Australian law-have at their core a single,
fundamental issue: The question of whether the creditors, or some other
party such as the firm's management, equity holders, or ajudge, should be
empowered to decide the fate of an insolvent firm. This Article contends
that the final decision making power for an insolvent firm's future should
rest with the firm's creditors, who effectively own insolvent firms. 46 The
Australian system largely does this; the American system does not.
The concept ofkeeping ultimate decisionmaking power with those who
bear the risk of loss-creditors-is consistent with the notion that when a
firm becomes insolvent outside of bankruptcy, the fiduciary duty of the
firm's directors and officers shifts from shareholders 47 to creditors. 48 The
z24467See generally supra note 2.
A solvent corporation does not owe creditors the same fiduciary obligations. The
court in In re Ben FranklinRetail Stores, Inc., held that
The shareholders, after all, own the corporation and management ofthe corporate
assets is vested in the directors. The directors are therefore entrusted with the
control and management of the property of others. As frequently happens when
a person is so entrusted with the property of others, the law imposes fiduciary
obligations on that person. Creditors, on the other hand, deal with corporations
by entering into contracts. Satisfaction oftheir claims against the corporate assets
requires only compliance with their contracts. So long as the corporation is
solvent, they require no additional protection; by definition, a solvent corporation, no matter how badly managed otherwise, is able to satisfy its contractual
obligations.
225 B.R. 646, 652-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406,
1417 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that under New York law, it is "well-established that a
corporation
does not have a fiduciary relationship with its debt security holders").
248
Many courts have supported this proposition. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V.v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. CIV. A.12510, 1991 WL 277613, at
*34 (Del Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (stating that "[a]t least where a corporation is operating in the
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rationale for this shift is straightforward. As the In re Ben FranklinRetail
Stores, Inc.249 court explained,
the economic rationale for the "insolvency exception" is that the value of
creditors' contract claims against an insolvent corporation may be
affected by the business decisions of managers. At the same time, the
claims of the shareholders are (at least temporarily) worthless. As a result
it is the creditors who "now occupy the position of residual owners."250

vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers,
but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise." In such instances, "circumstances may arise
when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may
diverge from the choice that the stockholders... would make if given the opportunity to
act."). FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that "[w]hen
a corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the
stockholders to the creditors"); In re Kingston Square Ass'n, 214 B.R. 713, 735 (Bankr.,
S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[IUt is universally agreed that when a corporation approaches insolvency
or actually becomes insolvent, directors' fiduciary duties expand to include general
creditors."); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784,787 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("When
the insolvency exception does arise, it creates fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of
creditors."); see also Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of
CorporateGovernance inBankruptcyReorganizations,72 AM.BANKR.L.J. 103, 108 (1998).

Frost states that
In a growing number of cases, courts hold that managerial allegiance must shift
to the creditors when the corporation approaches insolvency. Upon insolvency,
the residual claims ofthe shareholders become economically worthless. Creditors
who will go unpaid in the event of complete financial failure now occupy the
position of residual owners. Thus, it is not surprising that managerial allegiance
should depend upon the fortunes of the business.
Id. See generally Michael D. Sabbath, Liability of Officers andDirectorsfor Pre-Petition
Managementof the FinanciallyTroubled Company (reprinted in Southeastern Bankruptcy

Law Institute 2000 Annual Meeting materials) (on file with author).
A number of courts have held that while a fiduciary duty extends to the creditors upon
insolvency, it also remains with the shareholders as well. See, e.g., Sanford Fork & Tool Co.
v. Brown & Co., Ltd., 157 U.S. 312, 317-19 (1895) (finding that directors of insolvent
corporation, which was still going concern intending to continue its business, stand in
fiduciary relationship to both stockholders and creditors); In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714
F.2d 1266, 1277 (5th Cir. 1983) (declaring that officers and directors of insolvent
corporations "are fiduciaries to the corporations' stockholders and creditors" (quoting In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 28 B.R. 740, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983))); Geyer v. Ingersoll
Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("The existence of the fiduciary duties
at the moment of insolvency may cause directors to choose a course of action that best serves
the entire corporate enterprise rather than any single group interested in the corporation at a
point in time when shareholders' wishes should not be the directors['] only concern.").
249225 B.R. 646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
"°Id. at 653 (quoting Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787). This shift in fiduciary duty is often
described in terms of the creation of a trust fund to be managed for the benefit of corporate
creditors. See, e.g., Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944) ("An
insolvent corporation is civilly dead in the sense that its property may be administered in
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1. The EighthElement-AustralianSecuredCreditorswith a Lien on All or
Substantially All of the Debtor's Assets May Opt out of the Bankruptcy
Proceeding
As noted, secured creditors effectively own firms in bankruptcy, and
therefore, should be accorded the right to make the determination about an
insolvent firm's future. Voluntary Administration provides this opportunity
in an extreme form for those secured creditors who possess a lien on all or
substantially all of the debtor's assets. These creditors have the right during
the decision period to enforce their lien and effectively opt out of the
bankruptcy proceeding."'
A secured creditor may choose to opt out and enforce its lien for
obvious reasons-namely, it believes that the company has no chance to
survive and it wants to realize its value before the company's assets further
decrease in value. However, there are also several situations where a
secured creditor might refuse to opt out and instead support a reorganization. First, an undersecured creditor who believes that a liquidation will not
allow recoupment of value and further believes that a reorganization stands
a likely chance of providing viability to a financially distressed firm will not
opt out of a reorganization when its presence will be beneficial. Second,

equity as a trust fund for the benefit of creditors."); Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d
506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) ("If the corporation was insolvent at that time it is clear that
defendants, as officers and directors thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of the
property for the corporate creditor-beneficiaries." (quoting New York Credit Men's
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1953))); see also DENNIS J.
BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE 597 (5th
ed. 1998) (noting that while shareholders own corporation prior to insolvency, it is creditors
who become "equitable owners" upon insolvency due to their financial interest in company
assets). But see St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assoc. of N. Am., Inc., 589
N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999):
Creditors are not owed a duty by an insolvent corporation's directors and officers
to minimize any loss that may occur as a result of the corporation's insolvency.
To hold otherwise would allow creditors of a corporation, solvent or insolvent,
to interfere unduly and interject themselves in the day-to-day management of the
corporation. While it is axiomatic that creditors have the right to be repaid, it is
equally true that they do not have the right, absent an agreement to the contrary,
to dictate what course of action the directors and officers of a corporation shall
take in managing the company, or... to direct how the assets of the corporation
shall be disposed of to satisfy the debts of the corporation.
Id.
25
There is no question that this provision provides secured creditors an incentive to
take liens over substantially all ofthe company's assets. One argument against this provision,
therefore, is that it accordingly provides improper incentives for secured creditors to take
excessively broad liens, leaving little for unsecured creditors to look to in the way of nonencumbered assets.
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concerns about negative publicity may encourage the creditor to support the
administration."' 2 Third, administration may be an effective tool for a
creditor concerned about fraudulent conduct of directors and desiring an
investigation. Fourth, there may be reasons why the creditor does not want
to foreclose, and the appointment of an administrator may be a way of
recouping value without doing so. And finally, the creditor may be
concerned that a transaction will be challenged as fraudulent during a
liquidation, something the administrator is not empowered to challenge."'
The critical element is that the secured creditor, not the firm's equity,
decides whether the secured creditor of an insolvent firm continues to
remain at risk.

American bankruptcy law forbids opt outs.254 The rationale for this,

presumably, is that nobody would agree to be a part of a bankruptcy
proceeding unless the proceeding was mandatory upon all creditors. 255 This,
however, creates significant difficulty for secured creditors. Those who bear
no risk (like the equity of an insolvent company) have every incentive to
engage in behavior which maximizes their own prospects of recovery while

252

No lender will want to be seen as sounding the death knell of financially viable firms
prematurely. Such a lender will have more difficulty attracting business in the future. Thus,
one can expect creditors to make economically-rational decisions about when opting out is
appropriate.
2 53
See CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 239, at 31-32.
254
The only real exception is that the stay may be lifted by a secured creditor either for
cause, including the lack of adequate protection, or if the debtor has no equity in the property
and the property is not needed for an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1995).
25
See generallyJACKSON, supra note 180, at 12-13 (commenting that "[b]ankruptcy
provides a way to make... diverse individuals act as one, by imposing a collective and
compulsory proceeding on them"). In addition, courts have uniformly held that it violates
public policy for apartyto agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition. In re Jenkins
CourtAssoc., Ltd. P'ship, 181 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding ipsofacto clauses
precluding right to seek bankruptcy protectionperse invalid). It may, however, be possible
to waive the bankruptcy automatic stay, though a motion for a court order enforcing the
waiver is likely necessary. In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 818-19 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994)
(enforcing pre-petition agreement stating that mortgagor would not oppose mortgagee's relief
from stay motion in event of bankruptcy). Increasingly, courts have seen pre-petition waivers
of the stay as beingjust one factor in considering whether they should ultimately grant relief
from the stay. Compare In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 482-83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994)
(enforcing pre-petition waiver), with Farm Credit of Cent. Florida, ACA v. Polk, 160 B.R.
870, 873-74 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (refusing to enforce pre-petition waiver). For a discussion of
this issue, see Marshall E. Tracht, ContractualBankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory,
PracticeandLaw, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 301, 355 (1997) (positing that creditors attempting
to "opt out" of their duty to assist should "raise eyebrows").
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threatening the value held by secured creditors. 6 Secured
creditors, by
7
.27
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The Australian opt-out option for secured creditors with liens over the
majority of the company's assets is absolute-courts cannot prevent a
creditor from so acting. The results are twofold. First, the decisionmaking
process is placed in the hands of the appropriate party-the creditors who
bear the primary burden of an improper decision to reorganize a non-viable
company. And second, by providing additional protections to the secured
creditor, it helps to insure both that the availability of credit will remain
ongoing 5 8 and that the risk of non-enforcement of secured creditors' rights
will not lead them to raise the cost for others obtaining credit." 9
2. The Ninth Element-Cram Down in Australia Is More Limited Than in
the United States
(a) Cram Down in Australia and America
Cram down-the term for the confirmation ofnon-consensual plans of
reorganization-forms a significant feature of American bankruptcy law. It
is far more limited in Voluntary Administration. Cram down exists on two
levels-one for fully secured creditors, and one for undersecured and
256
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse OwnershipInterests:A Comment on Adequate ProtectionofSecured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHm. L. REV. 97, 107 (1984) ("Members of any group of
investors that would be eliminated by a present liquidation or sale of assets have nothing to
lose by seeking a solution that avoids a final distribution today.").
2
.Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitizationand CorporateRisk Allocation, 72 TUL.
L. REv. 101, 123 n.105 (1997) ("Because such claimants have fixed claims, they will not
benefit from any potential increase in value resulting from the reorganization. In the event of
catastrophe, however, such creditors may bear some of the losses.").
...
As the Australian Law Reform Commission noted: "[A]s a matter of economics, it
would be undesirable to impede the flow of credit by devaluing the security or other rights
which a creditor may require as a condition of giving credit." Australian Law Reform
Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry (Discussion Paper 32) at 31 (1987).
... Robert J. Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate Reorganization and the
Secured Creditor'sRights of Reclamation, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1975):
[T]he institution of secured credit, which makes capital available to high
risk enterprises which could not otherwise obtain it, is making a vital,
and perhaps an irreplaceable, contribution toward economic expansion.... While the contingency of nonenforcement will not affect all
potential borrowers equally, since the stronger would just have to pay
more for their credit, while the weaker would be denied credit altogether,
its effect on the cost of credit, and thereby upon economic growth, is
undeniable.
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unsecured creditors. In Australia, fully secured creditors with a lien on
substantially all of the debtor's property can avoid any risk of cram down
by opting out during the decision period and enforcing their liens. A secured
creditor who fails to opt out during the decision period but dissents from the
deed of arrangement can generally still enforce its lien unless a court
determines that doing so will have a "materially adverse" impact on the
purpose of the deed and that the secured creditor is adequately protected.
Thus, fully secured creditors are in a substantially better position in
Australia than they are in the United States, where secured claims are
subject to cram down.260
At first blush, undersecured and unsecured creditors in Australia
appear to be in essentially the same position as their American counterparts.
In each country, the prospect exists for undersecured or unsecured creditors
to be bound by a reorganization plan that they oppose.261 On further
analysis, however, the imposition on Australian undersecured and unsecured
creditors is more limited and reflects a radically different view of who
makes the ultimate decisions regarding the debtor's future. This is due in
large part to the presence in the United States of the new value exception to
the absolute priority rule.
(b) The New Value Exception
The new value exception raises the question of whether existing
shareholders who make additional necessary cash contributions to a
reorganized entity can retain their equity under a non-consensual plan which
fails to satisfy the absolute priority rule.2 62 The absolute priority rule states

26

Again, for dissenting secured creditors, a plan is fair and equitable and can be
crammed down ifthe secured creditor effectively receives the full economic equivalent of its
secured claim. Chapter 11 provides three methods of accomplishing this. First, a dissenting
secured creditor may keep its lien and receive payments on the plan's effective date equal to
the amount of the secured claim; second, the creditor may receive the indubitable equivalent
of its claim; or third, the property can be sold free and clear of the lien, with the creditor's
security interest attaching to the proceeds of the sale. This lien on proceeds may then be
treated under either of the other two options. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(2)(A) (1994).
261
In Australia, dissenting undersecured and unsecured creditors are bound by the vote
of the majority. In America, recall that impaired, dissenting unsecured creditors can have a
plan crammed down upon them if the plan satisfies the absolute priority rule in 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(B) (1994), which holds that a plan is fair and equitable with respect to an
impaired class if that class will receive full compensation for its allowed claims before any
junior class receives any distribution.
2 62
The United States Supreme Court phrased the following question:
The issue in this Chapter 11 reorganization case is whether a debtor's
prebankruptcy equity holders may, over the objection of a senior class of
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that shareholders have to pay dissenting, general unsecured creditors in full
before they are allowed to retain any interest in the new firm. Yet a number
of courts have allowed shareholders to retain an interest in a reorganized
entity notwithstanding the plan's inability to satisfy the absolute priority
rule based on the so-called "new value exception."
To understand why some courts have so ruled, a brief review of the
history of the exception is necessary. The statutory language of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided, inter alia, for creditors to consent to
plans of reorganization that impaired their interests, and required plans of
reorganization to be "fair and equitable." However, the old Bankruptcy Act
did not define what that phrase "fair and equitable" meant.
The idea of a new value exception arose in dicta as a result of the
equitable principles inherent in the bankruptcy process. The first case to
note the exception was Kansas City TerminalRailway Company v. Central
Union Trust Company of New York.263 In dicta, the court noted that it had
the right to modify, on equitable grounds, the strict priority scheme over the
objection ofjunior creditors when the senior secured creditor, whose claim
exceeded the value of the firm, consented, as long as the shareholder of the
debtor agreed to contribute new value to the reorganized company."6 In
Kansas City, the junior claimants would have received nothing under any
circumstances because the senior claimant's claim exceeded the value ofthe
assets. Thus, the key to this dicta is that the proposal in question did not
materially differ from a scenario whereby the firm was sold to the secured
creditor, who then allowed the old equity to buy into the new firm.
In Case v. Los Angeles LumberProducts Company Limited,265 a maj or
transformation occurred. The district courtjudge allowed equity to retain an
interest in the reorganized debtor based on the promise of continuing
management, influence and good will in the community.26 6 Unlike the Court
in the Kansas City decision, the district court in Case allowed this result

impaired creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership interests in the
reorganized entity, when that opportunity is given exclusively to the old equity
holders under a plan adopted without consideration of alternatives. We hold that
old equity holders are disqualified from participating in such a "new value"
transaction by the terms of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which in such
circumstances bars a junior interest holder's receipt of any property on account
of his prior interest.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 437
(1999) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994)).
263271 U.S. 445 (1926).
2
64d. at 454-55.
265308 U.S. 106 (1939).
266
1d. at 112-13.
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over the objection of the senior creditors. The Supreme Court reversed this
decision. In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court held that what was
proffered by the equity was insufficient to allow equity to retain an interest
in a non-consensual plan.267 The proposal was not tangible cash, and it had
no place in the asset column ofthe business's balance sheet.268 But, without
noting the factual differences between Kansas City and Case, Justice
Douglas indicated that the Court had not categorically rejected a new value
exception. It might be a different story, he suggested, had the shareholders
contributed "money or money's worth" to get the business back on its
269
feet.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code codified the meaning of the phrase "fair
and equitable" as requiring satisfaction of the absolute priority rule of §
1129(b)(2) .27 The meaning of the phrase thus appeared to no longer depend
upon common law analysis. This did not end the debate. Prior to the United
States Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Bank ofAmerica National Trust
and Savings Associationv. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership,271 courts had
essentially taken three approaches to the question of the new value
exception. One approach followed the reasoning ofDewsnup v. Timm,272 in
which the Supreme Court statedthatthe 1978 Bankruptcy Code did not alter
pre-Code judicially created practice unless the legislative history contains
at least some discussion of the intent to do so.27 Thus, the argument goes,
since the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the subj ect and the legislative history
is virtually silent, the rule of Los Angeles Lumber survived the enactment
of the 1978 Code. 4

267

1d. at 122.
1d. at 122-23.

268
269

1d. at 122.
27011 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994).

2 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
'72502 U.S. 410 (1992).
273

1d. at 419-20.

274

Courts following this view include In re Bonner Mall P'ship v. U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co., 2 F.3d 899, 912 (9th Cir. 1993) ("When Congress amends the bankruptcy
laws, it does not start from scratch. The Bankruptcy Code should not be read to abandon past
bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended to do so.") (citations
omitted); Coones v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 B.R. 247, 255 (D. Wyo. 1994) (noting that
new value exception survives because it is "a well-established pre-Code principle which
Congress failed to explicitly repudiate when it enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code"); In re
Sovereign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("Where Congress
intends for legislation to change the interpretation ofjudicially created concepts, it makes that
intent specific; absent such specific intent, it is presumed that Congress did not intend to
change prior-existing law.").
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A second and opposite approach is based on the fact that §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the 1978 Code replaced the Los Angeles Lumber
standard of "fair and equitable" with a congressionally-enacted standard.275
This new standard contains no reference to a new value exception, and since
the words of the statute are clear on their face, the appropriate conclusion
appears to be that the new value exception failed to survive the enactment
of the 1978 Code.276
The third approach suggests that the new value exception is not an
exception to the absolute priority rule at all. The absolute priority rule
prohibits retention of one's interest in a reorganized entity "on account of'
old interests. In cases where old equity is contributing new capital, the
argument goes, its retained interest in the reorganized debtor is based on this
new, necessary contribution, not "on account of' its prior interest. 7 7
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Bank ofAmerica National Trust
27 9 Prior
and Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.
27"11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
276

See, e.g., In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (stating that it
views "Congress' failure to include the exception in this new definition as the significant factor here rather than its failure to expressly repudiate the exception"); Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The language of
the Code strongly suggests that [the new value exception] did not [survive], and we are to
take this language seriously even when it alters pre-Code practices."); Piedmont Assocs. v.
CIGNA Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R. 75, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("This court believes that
the plain language of§ I 129(b)(2)(B) and the intent of Congress precludes the existence of
any new value exception to the absolute priority rule.").
z77In re BonnerMall Partnership,2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), illustrates this approach.
The case involved a traditional single asset scenario, and the debtor's plan provided, inter
alia, for the partners to receive nothing on their claims. Id. at 905. However, to raise
additional capital for the new corporation, the partners would contribute a total of $200,000
in cash to Bonner Mall Properties in exchange for 2 million of the 4 million authorized shares
ofthe new corporation's common stock. Id.No other persons were designated to receive stock
in exchange for such contributions. Id.
The Court held that "the Code permits the confirmation of a reorganization plan that
provides for the infusion of capital by shareholders of the bankrupt corporation in exchange
for stock if the plan meets the conditions required prior to the Code's adoption." Id. at 911.
Furthermore, the Court held that if the value added by the old equity was in fact "new,
substantial, [in] money or money's worth, necessary for successful reorganization, and
reasonably equivalent to the value or interest received," the plan will not violate the absolute
priority rule. Id. Under these circumstances, no violation is present because the plan will not
give old equity property "on account of' prior interests, but instead will allow the former
owners to participate in the reorganized debtor though a substantial, necessary, and fair new
value contribution. Id. at 900, 909.
279526 U.S. 434 (1999). Prior to LaSalle, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197 (1988), was the only post-Code case in which the Supreme Court dealt with the new
value exception. Ahlers considered whether the promise by the owners of a failing family
farm of future "labor, experience, and expertise" was sufficient for the confirmation of a plan
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to this decision, cram down of unsecured creditors in the United States
reflected very different values than cram down in Australia. In Australia,
while cram down is possible, it is imposed by the majority will of the
creditors, not by the firm's equity holders (or by a court). Thus, the binding
of a non-consensual plan in Australia is something akin to the "rule" that
Kansas City created, whereby the dissenting creditors could be bound if the
dominating group of creditors (secured with a lien on everything in the case
of Kansas City, and a majority of all creditors in the Australian scenario)
determined to do so.280 For those American courts that have historically
accepted the vitality of the new value exception, the decision to bind
dissenting unsecured creditors is made not by other creditors, but rather by
the equity holders (and a court) who, if the firm is insolvent, bear no risk if
the reorganization ultimately fails.
LaSalle provides some relief for unsecured creditors, but it does not
return the cramdown decision in the United States to creditors, which would
be something akin to the Kansas City model. The debtor in LaSalle was a
single asset limited partnership that owned fifteen floors of a downtown
Chicago office building.28 1 Bank ofAmericahad lentthe debtor $93 million,
secured by a non-recourse first mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, its
office space.282 Following default and the commencement of foreclosure
proceedings, the debtor filed under Chapter 11.113
The Debtor proposed a plan that provided for the following: Pursuant
to § 506, the Bank's $93 million claim was split into a secured claim of
$54.5 million and an unsecured deficiency claim of $38.5 million.284 The
bank's secured claim was to be paid in full over a period of seven to ten
years by means of a note secured by a mortgage on the property.2 85 The

of reorganization that otherwise did not satisfy the requirements of the absolute priority rule.
Id. at 199. The Court found that the owner's promise was "intangible, inalienable, and, in all
likelihood, unenforceable," and, quoting the language of Case, held that it "has no place in
the asset column of the balance sheet of the new [entity]."Id. at 204 (quoting Case, 308 U.S.
at 122-23). The Ahlers Court went on to state that "the statutory language and the legislative
history of § 1129(b) clearly bar any expansion of any exception to the absolute priority rule
beyond that recognized in our cases at the time Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code." Id. at 206. In 1994, the Court granted certiorari on a new value exception case called
In reBonnerMallPartnership,
2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.granted,510 U.S. 39 (1994).
However,
this
case
settled
before
ever reaching the Court.
28
°Kansas City, 271 U.S. at 455.
28
LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 438.
28
2

1d.

2 3

8 Id "

2

"Bank of Am., Ill. v. 203 N. LaSalle Street P'ship, 195 B.R. 692, 696-97 (N.D. Ill.

1996).28
1Id. at 698.
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bank's unsecured deficiency claim was classified separately from the
unsecured claims of trade creditors-an issue whose legitimacy was not
raised before the Supreme Court-and would be discharged for an estimated
16% of its present value.286 The remaining $90,000 of unsecured claims
would be paid in full, without interest, on the plan's effective date. 287 As no
interest would be paid, this class was deemed impaired; thus, a vote in favor
of the plan by this class would satisfy the § 1129(a)(10) requirement that at
least one class of impaired claims accept the plan.288 Certain of the debtor's
former partners would contribute $6.125 million in new capital over a fiveyear period (worth $4.1 million in present value) in exchange for 100%
ownership of the reorganized debtor.28 9 The debtor's former equity holders
were the only parties eligible to contribute new capital.290
The bank voted its unsecured claim against the plan, and then objected
to confirmation of the plan on the grounds of the absolute priority
rule-former equity holders would receive property even though the Bank's
unsecured deficiency claim would not be paid in full.2 91 The Bankruptcy
Court approved the plan nevertheless, and the district court and the Seventh
Circuit both affirmed.292
The Supreme Court did not decide whether the Code includes a new
value exception. Rather, the Court determined that even ifthe exception was
encompassed within the Code, the debtor's proposed plan would still fail to
satisfy §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 293 The core rationale of the opinion is that §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) was violated since the plan, adopted without consideration
of alternatives and over the objection of a senior class of impaired creditors,
gave the debtor's pre-bankruptcy equity holders the exclusive opportunity
to contribute
new capital and receive ownership interests in the reorganized
294
entity.
The Court began its analysis by noting that the statutory language is
"inexact., 295 It then traced the development ofthe pre-Code absolute priority
rule, now codified at § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), emphasizing that the new value
exception pre-Code "never rose above the technical level of dictum in any
opinion of [the] Court," and before the enactment of the current Code, no
286

1d. at 694.
1d. at 698.
288
1d. at 694.
289
1d. at 698.
290
LaSalle, 195 B.R. at 698.
z9gld at 707.
292
1d. at 708.
293
LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458.
294
1d. at 456.
287

295

1d. at 444.
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court ever relied on the dictum in Case to approve a plan that gave old
equity a property interest after reorganization.2 96
The Court next determined that the legislative history did not eliminate
the possibility that the codified absolute priority rule has a new value
exception.29 7 The Court stated:
Although there is no literal reference to "new value" in the phrase "on
account of such junior claim," the phrase could arguably carry such an
implication in modifying the prohibition against receipt by junior
claimants of any interest under a plan while
a senior class of unconsent298
ing creditors goes less than fully paid.

Turning to the statutory language, the Court considered three possible
meanings of the phrase "on account of." The first was that the language "on
account of" means something like "in exchange for," or "in satisfaction of."
The court rejected this interpretation.29 9 The second position, also rejected
by the court, is the more common understanding that "on account of' means
"because of" 3"' Rather, the Court turned to a "less absolute statutory
296

1d. at 445.

297

1d. at 448.

298

1d. at 449.

299

LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449. The Court did so for two reasons, one textual, the other
practical. As for the former:
Subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) forbids not only receipt of property on account of the
prior interest but its retention as well. A common instance of the latter would be
a debtor's retention of an interest in the insolvent business reorganized under the
plan. Yet it would be exceedingly odd to speak of "retain[ing]" property in
exchange for the same property interest, and the eccentricity of such a reading is
underscored by the fact that elsewhere in the Code the drafters chose to use the
very phrase "in exchange for," §1 123(a)(5)(J) (a plan shall provide adequate
means for implementation, including "issuance of securities ofthe debtor.., for
cash, for property, for existing securities, or in exchange for claims or interests.")
Id. at 449-50 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). As for the latter:
The unlikelihood that Congress meant to impose a condition as manipulable as
subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) would be if"on account of" meant to prohibit merely an
exchange unaccompanied by a substantial infusion of new funds but permit one
whenever substantial funds changed hands. "Substantial" or "significant" or
"considerable" or like characterizations of a monetary contribution would
measure it bythe Lord Chancellor's foot,and an absolute priority rule so variable
would not be much of an absolute.
Id. at 450.
3
.1d. While recognizing that "what activates the absolute priority rule" is "a causal
relationship between holding the prior claim or interest and receiving or retaining property,"
Id. at 451, the court's rationale for rejecting this standard was the following:
If, as is likely, the drafters were treating junior claimants or interest holders as a
class at this point then the simple way to have prohibited the old interest holders
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prohibition" that would better "reconcile the two recognized policies
underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going concerns and maximizing
3 1 The Court suggested that
property available to satisfy creditors.""
a new
value plan would violate absolute priority:
whenever old equity's later property would come at a price that failed to
provide the greatest possible addition to the bankruptcy estate, and it
would always come at a price too low when the equity holders obtained
or preserved an ownership interest for less than someone else would have
paid. A truly full value transaction, on the other hand, would pose no
threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any reorganization, provided
of course
that the contribution be in cash or be realizable money's
302
worth.
The Court, however, specifically declined to decide what level of
causation was required to bar a new value plan. Although the Court stated
that "the debtor's exclusive opportunity to propose a plan under § 1121(b)
is not itself 'property' within the meaning of subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii)," the
Court observed that the debtor's plan was "doomed... by its provision for
vesting equity in the reorganized business in the Debtor's partners without
extending an opportunity to anyone else either to compete for that equity or
to propose a competing reorganization plan. 303 The Court emphasized that
the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its protection against the
market's scrutiny of the purchase price by means of competing bids or
even competing plan proposals, renders the partners' right a property
interest extended "on account of' the old equity position and therefore
subject to an unpaid senior creditor class's objection.30 4

from receiving anything over objection would have been to omit the "on account
of"phrase entirely from subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii). On this assumption, reading the
provision as a blanket prohibition would leave "on account of"as a redundancy,
contrary to the interpretive obligation to try to give meaning to all the statutory
language. One would also have to ask why Congress would have desired to
exclude prior equity categorically from the class of potential owners following
a cramdown. Although we have some doubt about the Court of Appeals's
assumption that prior equity is often the only source of significant capital for
reorganizations, old equity may well be in the best position to make a go of the
reorganized enterprise and so may be the party most likely to work out an equityfor-value reorganization.
Id. at 452-53 (citations omitted).
3
'Id. at 453.
302
1d. at 453-54 (citations omitted).
303

3

1d. at 454.

041d. at 456.
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The Court further observed that although it could be argued that the
opportunity has no market value, "the law is settled that any otherwise
cognizable property interest must be treated as sufficiently valuable to be
recognized under the Bankruptcy Code."3 5
The critical issue in the opinion seems to be the Court's statement that
it would be "necessary for old equity to demonstrate its payment of top
dollar," to ensure that it did not receive its interest in the reorganized debtor
"on account of' its former equity interest." 6 And, "the best way to
determine value is exposure to a market,"30 7 not by judicial valuation.
However, the Court declined to give detailed guidance regarding the means
of accomplishing this. It concluded:
Whether a market test would require an opportunity to offer competing
plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same interest sought
by old equity is a question we do not decide here. It is enough to say,
assuming a new value corollary, that plans providing junior interest
holders with exclusive opportunities free from competition and without
benefit of market valuation fall within the prohibition of §
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 0 s
Not surprisingly, the decision in LaSalle has come under careful
scrutiny. Most commentators believe that the opinion is an implicit
recognition of the ongoing viability of the new value exception.30 9 It seems
clear, however, that the debtor cannot retain the exclusive opportunity in a
cram down to contribute to the reorganized entity because this would be "on
account of' their former equity interest. What this actually means is less
clear. It appears that there must be some exposure to the market, but it is
unclear whether this exposure can be satisfied by the presence of competing

3
3

'LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 455 (citations omitted).

161d.
at 457.
30
7

Id

38

° 1d. at 458.
3
.See David R. Kuney, The Supreme Court and New Value: The Elusive Searchfor
"True Value "andNeutralBargainingDevices:
Market Valuevs. JudicialValue, 8 J.BANKR.

L. & PRAc. 505, 507 (1999). Support for this position is typically found in several places.
First, the Court's conclusion that the legislative history does not eliminate the possibility that
the absolute priority rule may contain a new value exception. Second, the Court's rejection
of the argument that former equity holders should be barred across the board from
participating in the reorganized debtor. And third, the Court's belief that the statute's "on
account of" language was intended to reconcile the two policies underlying Chapter 11 of
preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors.
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plans or solely by competing bids. The likely result of this ambiguity is
increased uncertainty accompanied by increased litigation."'
LaSalle provides additional financial protection for undersecured and
unsecured creditors in Chapter 11. As noted, the Supreme Court determined
that to be consistent with the goal of maximizing creditor return, old equity
needs to pay at least as much as any third party would pay for a bankruptcy
court to conclude that their interest in the reorganized entity is not "on
account of' their prior interests. 1' In addition, by reflecting a general
preference for economic self determination,3 12 rather than a view that
Chapter 11 should be a court-driven, debtor-protective regime, the Court
suggested that decisions ultimately should be creditor-driven." 3
But LaSalle failed to normalize investment incentives by returning
them to a scenario where bankruptcy investment incentives remain
economically comparable to those that exist under non-bankruptcy law.314
To do this, investment incentives must reflect both potential gain and
potential loss. Outside bankruptcy, equity has both something to gain and
something to lose. They thus will make economically rational decisions.
Inside bankruptcy, these incentives change, and equity has reasons for
making unduly risky decisions. This result is antithetical to the primary
goals of bankruptcy.3 15
So while LaSalle guaranteed unsecured creditors the maximum value
the market would bear in return for their being forced to accept a plan they

31
See generally Bruce A. Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy: Some InitialMusings
on the Ultimate Impact of Bank ofAmerica, NT & SA v. 203 North LaSalle Partnership,16
BANKR. DEv. J. 345, 355-60 (2000) (positing that Court's ambiguity in LaSalle will result
in increased reorganization and Chapter 11 litigation.).
"'LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453-54. "A truly full value transaction, on the other hand,
would pose no threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any reorganization, provided of
course that the contribution be in cash or be realizable money's worth." Id.
" t2Congress enacted Chapter 11 with the "view that creditors and equity security
holders are very often better judges of the debtor's economic viability and their own
economic self-interest than courts, trustees, or [governmental agencies such as] the SEC." Id.
at 458 n.28 (quoting G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Mike Sigal, & William H. Schorling, Review of
the Proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Pertainingto Business
Bankruptcies: PartOne, 53 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1405-06 n.136 (1998)).
33
See G. Eric Brunstad Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Broader
Implications of the Supreme Court's Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle
Partnership,
54 BUS. LAW. 1475, 1479-80 (1999).
314
1d. at 1480 (arguing for competitive choice theory in bankruptcy context, meaning
that "the best decisions regarding what is to be done with bankrupt debtors, their obligations,
and their assets are more likely to be realized if decision-making in the bankruptcy context
is made to approximate decision-making in the context of financially healthy firms outside
the bankruptcy arena").
35
1d. at 1482-83.
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opposed, it did not return control to the creditors themselves to determine
the firm's future. By contrast, in Australia, control is with the creditors.
Thus the creditors who own bankrupt firms make the decisions about the
firm's future, a normalization of bankruptcy investment incentives. If it is
in a creditor's best interest that a company be continued or that equity retain
a stake under a deed that impairs unsecured creditors, the creditors may so
opt. As Professors Baird and Jackson have written, "[b]ankruptcy law makes
a grave mistake if it assumes that a junior (or another class) will make the
correct decision about the deployment of the assets without a legal rule that
forces it to take account of investors as a group .... [T]he best way of
ensuring the correct decision-by which we mean that the decision that is
not distorted by the self-interest of individuals at the expense of the interests
of the group-is to create a legal rule that imposes upon the person who
makes the decision all the benefits if he decides correctly and all the costs
if he guesses wrong. '
V. CONCLUSION

In contrast to the Australian model, the American approach to
corporate reorganization is relatively ineffective. Not only is it slow,
expensive, and administratively cumbersome, it also provides inefficient and
otherwise inappropriate investment incentives and it frequently empowers
the wrong party to make vital decisions. As a result, the American model
fails to consistently achieve the primary goal of a corporate bankruptcy
system-distinguishing those firms with long term potential viability from
those firms without such prospects, and assuring continuance of the former
and liquidation of the latter.

316

Baird & Jackson, supra note 256, at 124-25.
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